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A View from the United States-

Social, Economic, and Legal Change,
the Persistence of the State, and
Immigration Policy in the Coming Century
JOHN

A. SCANLAN*

In this article, Professor Scanlan argues that in spite of recent
trends toward globalism, traditionally composed nation-states,
especially the United States, will continue to exercise localized
control over immigration and receiving nations may pursue
increasingly restrictivepolicies. The author begins with a history
of recent U.S. and European Union (EU) immigration policies,
positing that State self-interest has always played a central role.
Next, he traces the post-World War II development of the
"internationalrefugee regime" as well as the development of the
European Union's "open"- labor market. Professor Scanlan
predicts that internationalagencies will become less efficaciousfor
several reasons, including the loss of their galvanizingforce, the
fight against communism. Next he argues that though labor moves
relativelyfreely throughout EU Member States, the EU's stance on
immigration from non-EU States has become more and more
restrictionist. Further, to the extent the labor market is open, the
situation developed out of circumstances peculiar to post-War
Europe, and therefore the EU example provides little hope that
North America will become similarly unified. The author concludes
with a prediction that with the possible exception of concerted
responses to emergencies, the nation-states of the developed world
will continue to pursue self-interested immigration policies,
including the vigorous guarding of their borders.

I. INTRODUCTION

"Immigration policy" and "immigration law," as those terms are used
today in the United States-and, I believe, in most of the developed
world-are part of the traditional vocabulary of national self-interest and

* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
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realpolitik. Their customary use takes a number of important things for,
granted: a unitary State existing in a world made up almost entirely of
similar sovereign entities; a body of legislation focusing particularly and
precisely on which aliens should be permitted to enter the State and under
what conditions; a sophisticated bureaucracy entrusted with the responsibility
of policing the border and removing "undesirables"; and a set of elaborate
procedural guidelines regulating the activities of that bureaucracy. Although
hardly necessary for immigration control, the contemporary western tradition
also assumes a set of "democratic" processes that generate the legislation
and that control entrances that make the legislators accountable to the people
who elected them.
In a profound sense, then, immigration law and immigration policies are
integrally related to our modern conception of the "State." They relate most
obviously in the sense that they are products of political and bureaucratic
arrangements that have achieved their fullest development since the
Enlightenment. Less obviously, they relate because of the purpose they
frequently serve-the preservation of the political and social status quo, or
the promotion of particular interests-and because of the politically
constitutive role they always perform. In a recent article, Timothy Mitchell
described how immigration "practices" have helped bring our conception of
the State into being and have endowed the State with the appearance of
independence, permanence, and power:
The larger presence of the state in several ways takes the form of
a framework that appears to stand apart from the social world and
provide an external structure. One characteristic of the modern
state, for example, is the frontier. By establishing a territorial
boundary and exercising absolute control over movement across it,
state practices define and help constitute a national entity. Setting
up and policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern social
practices--continuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration
laws, inspections, currency control, and so on. These mundane
arrangements, most of them unknown two hundred or even one
hundred years ago, help manufacture an almost transcendental
entity, the nation state.1

i. Timothy Mitchell, The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics, 85
AM. POL. So. REV. 77, 94 (1991) (emphasis added).

19941

A VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES

State practices involving migration and the establishment of frontiers
have been enmeshed in global processes of change from the beginning. As
Aristide Zolberg and John Guy have both observed (albeit from very
different vantage points), the very notion of the independent nation-state is
rooted in the desire, political will, and administrative ability to distinguish
an identifiable, national "us" from the rest of the world's population-a
large universe of"thems," frequently caricatured and categorized as distorted
and maligned versions of ourselves.2 Transnational events, although not
exclusively responsible for the process, clearly played a major role in
promoting and enabling the notion. Guy, for example, argues that the
modem concept of the English State emerged during the Tudor era and was
motivated in large measure by the propaganda value of distinguishing a
godly, Protestant, and English people from its ungodly, Catholic, and foreign
competitors and opponents-most notably, Spain and France. Dynastic,
religious, and economic struggles involving more than one realm helped
forge national identities and shared senses of on-going national interests
The issue confronting us today is whether a number of transnational
processes, apparently quite different from those that characterized earlier
eras, will lead to new political formations that will radically transform
governmental practices as they affect or attempt to influence migration. If
the "modem State" (which is probably several hundred years older than
Mitchell credits) owes some or all of its existence to barbed wire, passport
controls, and immigration laws-or to similar but older, and arguably more
"primitive" physical and legal impediments to movement-might we not
argue that the State--or at least, its border-regulating function-is on the
verge of disappearing, that technology, capitalism, and bureaucratic
centralism are about to accomplish what Marxist historical determinism
could not? The argument seems fairly simple: advances in technology
enable information, goods, economic capital, and people to move about the
globe in ever-increasing amounts, at an ever-increasing speed; the
internationalization of businesses provides additional incentives to speed
those flows, even as it deprives nationalgovernments of the effective means
to regulate them; the economic advantages of "free trade" extend beyond the
movement of goods and capital and include more "open" immigration; and

2. See JOHN Guy, TUDOR ENGLAND 1-29 (1988); Aristide R. Zolberg, The Formation of New
States as a Refugee-Generating Process, 467 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. So. 24 (1983).
3. GuY, supra note 2.
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the movement to "harmonize" trade inevitably leads to more wide-reaching
agreements and the creation of new bureaucracies that may or may not result
in the obliteration of political boundaries, but which certainly facilitate the
movement of people, preempting or replacing restrictive national
immigration laws.
The argument I have just made is, of course, a parody. It is also
incomplete since it ignores an important set of facts that clearly are related
to "globalization," "progress," and migration-namely, population statistics
and other demographic data. The argument also implicitly characterizes all
migration as economically motivated, ignoring evidence that fear of
persecution and the desire for family reunification motivate many
emigrants,4 and that the States which admit these emigrants are frequently
seeking political or diplomatic, rather than economic, advantage. Yet even
in the abbreviated and simplified form in which I have presented the
argument, it deserves respectful attention. Thus, I have no doubt whatsoever
that there are significant economic, political, and institutional forces at work
that threaten the stability of restrictive immigration regimes and also portend
the transfer of at least some decision-making and administrative power over
migration to intergovernmental organizations. I will note some of these
forces and their probable effects in the next. section of this paper. I will
then explain why, in my view, globalization phenomena are likely to have
only marginaland limited effects on U.S. immigration policy and law in the

4. Refugee admissions are governed by a unique set of legislative provisions in the United
States. Thus, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (1988
& Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter INA], provides a definition of "refugee"; INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), provides a mechanism for admitting an annually-designated number of
"refugees" to the United States from countries of "first asylum" or countries of origin; and INA § 208,
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988), provides a mechanism for granting "asylum" to individuals who have reached
U.S. territory and then claim that they meet the refugee definition. See also INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which provides for the grant of "withholding of deportation or
exclusion" to those who can demonstrate that their "life or freedom would be threatened," a requirement
that has been restrictively interpreted so that the applicant must demonstrate that the likelihood of death
or physical harm is "more likely than not." See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). U.S.
refugee admissions policy is discussed in detail below. See infra part II.B.
The separate allocation system governing ordinary immigrant admissions distinguishes between
"family reunification" and "employment-related" visas. See INA § 203 (a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § I I53(a)-(b)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). 1 deal extensively with the latter category below, but ignore the former almost
entirely. My justification for doing so rests on the fact that "family reunification" allocations are all
derivative, since they depend on the immigration status of another person. Virtually all "anchor"
migrants petitioning on behalf of another family member have either entered the country as job-seekers
or as refugees.
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coming decades. Finally, I will suggest that these limited effects are the
predictable consequences of a world system which, at least where migration
is concerned, continues to recognize local interests and the priority of the
nation-state, and affords only a limited scope for the "internationalization"
or "globalization" of immigration policy.
II. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD
Jeffrey Passel has conveniently divided all of immigration policy and
law-like ancient Gaul-into "three fundamentally different sets of rules..
. . those that govern legal immigration (i.e., mainly sponsored admission for

family and work); those that govern humanitarian admissions (refugees and
asylees); and those that govern illegal entry."' I am not sure the separate
parts are as distinct as Passel believes; nor would I necessarily employ the
same labels he adopts. Nevertheless, I will use his trisection to map global
changes and the probable future of U.S. immigration policy and law.
A. Legal Migrants

In the domain of "legal immigration," U.S. policy and law are going
to be affected by the continuation and possible acceleration of the shift of
manufacturing to places with abundant supplies of cheap labor and lax
environmental laws. The demand for an unskilled or semi-skilled domestic
manufacturing labor force is likely to decline, and Congress is likely to stay
on the path it entered on in 1990 and further reduce the legal immigration
opportunities for people with such limited skills. On the other hand,
immigration "quotas" will almost certainly increase for the favored few:
highly-educated professionals and those with demonstrated executive or
managerial skills.6 Both developments can be tied to changes in the global

5.

Jeffrey S. Passel & Michael Fix, US. Immigration in a Global Context: Past, Present, and

Future, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 9 (1994).
6. This pattern is not peculiar to the United States. Demetrios Papademtriou, looking at the
transnational labor market, has "identified two new groups of 'international citizens': one with very
high skills, the other with very low skills. Immigration policy treats only the first group as desirable,
thus, compelling the second group to immigrate illegally." Paul Burkhead, Stirring the Pot: Immigrant
and Refugee Challenger to the United States and the World, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 579, 583 (1994).
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economy. Neither, however, suggests that global factors are likely to bring
about any sea change in the U.S. approach to labor migration.
Recruitment of migrants from abroad to fulfill specific perceived labor
needs has been a hallmark of U.S. policy since the early colonial days. The
conquest of the continent by Europeans led inexorably to the cultivation of
vast tracts of land, the introduction of sophisticated industries, and the
development of a complex transportation web. Immigrants were needed to
farm, participate in manufacturing, and provide a myriad of services.
7
Although individual colonies-and later, individual States T-attempted
to
limit immigration, physical proximity, porous borders, a conscious effort to
promote "interstate commerce," coordinated economic development, and
(particularly after the Civil War) greater political unity almost totally
undercut their efforts. Bowing to public pressure, the federal government
began restricting the importation of Chinese "Coolies" in the 1860s,'
enacted the first Chinese Exclusion law in 1882, 9 and began to bar the
admission of "contract laborers" from any country in the 1880s. Although
anti-Asian measures were remarkably effective, 0 the contract labor laws

7. No systematic account of colonial immigration policy and law has been published in this
century. I am currently writing a book on the subject. For a comprehensive account of attempts by
individual states to limit immigration, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century ofAmerican Immigration
Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
8. See 29 U.S. Rev. Stat. § 2158 (2d ed. 1878) (repealed 1974).
9. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. Subsequent provisions dealing with the exclusion
and deportation of the Chinese were enacted in 1884, 1888, 1892, 1893, 1898, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1904,
and 1912. As late as June 14, 1940, Congress "conferred upon the Attorney General the authority, power
and jurisdiction by virtue of any law relating to the exclusion from and residence within the United States
• . . of Chinese and persons of Chinese descent . . . " 8 U.S.C.A. § 261 (1940) (repealed 1943),
summarizing 1940 Reorg. Plan No. V., eff. June 14, 1940, 5 F.R. 2423, 54 Stat. 1238.
10. Asian immigration began after the California Gold Rush and continued until almost
completely eliminated by a series of restrictive measures enacted between 1882 and 1924. The
immigrants included "approximately 430,000 Chinese, 380,000 Japanese, and 150,000 Filipinos, [as well
as] about 8,000 Koreans and a similar number of Asian Indians." RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM
A DIFFERENT SHORE 65 (1989). Takaki has summarized the relevant law:
Unlike European immigrants, Asians were . . . victimized by the institutionalized racial
discrimination of public policies. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 singled out the Chinese
on a racial basis, and the National Origins Act of 1924 totally prohibited Japanese
immigration ....
Furthermore, the 1924 law . . . allow[ed] European-immigrant men to
return to their homelands and bring wives back to the United States. Their wives were
accorded nonquota status, that is, there were no limits to the number of European women who
could come here as wives. The law had the very opposite effect on Asian-immigrant
communities. Seeking to prevent the development of Asian families here, it barred the entry
of women from China, Japan, Korea, and India. Even U.S. citizens could not bring Asian
wives into the country ....
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had little practical effect until 1924 and were repealed in 1952." Even
when they were most stringently enforced, their effects were limited by the
passage of contradictory legislation creating "special" programs to bring tens
of thousands of Mexican and Caribbean agricultural workers "temporarily"
12
to the United States.
The influx of foreign workers waxed and waned considerably
(flourishing, for example, in the period from 1846 to 1856 and in the last
decades of the nineteenth century, diminishing rapidly in the late 1850s and
early 1860s, and almost totally coming to a halt during the Great
Depression), sometimes responding to "nativist" and "protectionist" lobbies
who counselled the abolition of all migration to protect U.S. jobs. Yet it
was probably clear to most policymakers prior to 1965 that the United States
was part of a global economy, and that such an economy included the
transnational exchange not only of goods and capital, but also of labor. The
Immigration Amendments of 1965" underlined that understanding by
establishing permanent annual "preferences" for a limited number of skilled
and unskilled immigrants coming to the United States to perform jobs for
which no U.S. workers were readily available. (That act and subsequent
legislation also institutionalized the granting of employment-related nonimmigrant visas to especially well-qualified aliens.) 4
Id. at 14. Some provisions of the 1924 act were clearly redundant since the Chinese Exclusion Act, as
modified and strengthened by Congress, remained in effect until 1943. Id. at 378. Furthermore, the socalled "Gentlemen's Agreement" between the U.S. and Japanese governments in 1908 had, with a few
exceptions, ended Japanese immigration to the United States.
1I. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and David Martin provide a good account of the legislative history
of the transformation of the "contract labor" provision into the modem requirement that (some)
immigrants obtain "labor certification." See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN,
IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 154-55 (1985).
12. See generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION
AND THE I.N.S. (1992); JULIAN SAMORA, OPERATION WETBACK (1971); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
MIGRATORY LABOR, MIGRATORY LABOR IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE (195 1).

13. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
14. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Among the
most important are INA § 101 (aXI5XB) (business visitors); § 101(a)(15)(H) (temporary workers of
"distinguished merit and ability"); § I 101(a)(15)(HXii)(a) (seasonal agricultural laborers and other
persons "coming temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services"; and
intracompany transferees "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized
knowledge."). Id. Other categories include "treaty traders" and "treaty investors"; registered nurses;
aliens of "extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics"; foreign entertainers;
cultural exchange program participants; and representatives of foreign religious organizations. INA §§
101(a)(15)(E)(i)-(ii), (H)(i)(a), (0), (P), (Q), (R).
Qualifications for these visas vary considerably. Some are limited in number. Generally, bettereducated aliens and those doing highly-skilled "professional" work find it much easier to obtain
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Since 1965, the internationalization of business and of the labor market
has accelerated. The recent conclusion of negotiations on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has produced the most
comprehensive multilateral trade agreement ever. In Europe, the Common
Market has become the "European Union" (EU). Within the Union-which
has social, cultural, and environmental dimensions, as well as strictly
economic ones-goods, money, and labor circulate freely.
On this
continent, the recently-concluded North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) 5 is a considerably more modest undertaking; as its title
indicates, it is principally a "free trade agreement" among the United States,
Mexico, and Canada, adopted to promote "the agreed objectives of a
vigorous economic relationship, maintaining sustained growth, and
expanding trade and investment [among] the [three] countries."' 16 Although
Congress has characterized NAFTA as "the most comprehensive trade
agreement ever negotiated [which] creates the world's largest integrated
market for goods and services," 7 NAFTA's drafters consciously chose to
avoid creating an integrated continental labor market. 8 The only provision

nonimmigrant employment-related visas than do unskilled and poorly-educated laborers.
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296-456, 612-799 (1993),
33 I.L.M. 649-57, 663-64, 671-80 (1994).
16. H.R. REP. No. 361 (I), 103d Cong., IstSess. 5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2552, 2555.
17. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2558.
18. See Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders, 27 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 937, 978
(1994):
The signatories unquestionably did not intend the trade agreement to provide a complete
solution to the outstanding labor migration questions among the United States, Mexico, and
Canada. As Alan Nelson, former Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), mentioned in a conversation ... the 'T1word was mysteriously absent from
any discussion of NAFTA....
NAFTA expressly recognizes each country's sovereign right to protect its domestic labor
force and pursue its own immigration policies, thereby allowing each nation to take measures
designed "to ensure border security."
Id. at 956-57 (citations omitted) (quoting North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art.
1601, 32 I.L.M. 664 (1993); and a private conversation with Alan Nelson).
Johnson also quotes Ambassador Julius Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative under President
Bush:
[L]abor migration between [the] United States and Mexico is not a subject of negotiation
because "[w]hen we get into broad scale immigration, you're not dealing with trade or even
wholly economic issues, you're dealing with social issues. And there's a whole panoply of
other policies involved, and we've agreed that it will not be part of this negotiation."
Id. at 957 n.75 (quoting from Cyrille Rogacki, An Interview with Ambassador Julius Katz, 26 COLUM.
J.WORLD Bus. 39 (1991)).
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that directly affects immigration modifies existing law only slightly and is
likely to benefit a fairly small number of Mexicans and Canadians actively
involved in trading and investing in the United States. 9
However, internationalization over the last several decades has not been
limited to the sort of "free trade" in goods, services, and capital promoted
directly by treaty. U.S. firms, like their counterparts in other advanced
capitalist countries, have learned that costs can be lowered substantially by
shifting production to countries where labor costs, taxes, and regulatory
burdens are low. Technological developments-particularly in the areas of
electronic data processing and communication-have also enabled firms to
shift many service jobs outside the nation's borders.
Yet, the exportation of manufacturing and service jobs is not the only
component of the restructured international marketplace of the late twentieth
century. The transformation of the United States into a service-oriented
economy has contributed to the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs;
however, it has also contributed to the creation of millions of both high- and
low-skilled service jobs. The demand for service providers-particularly
those whose jobs cannot be "farmed out" to other countries and those
involved in the management of multinational corporations and the operation
of financial markets-will almost certainly increase in the decades to come.
Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that much of the new demand in the
lower ranges of the service sector cannot be met by U.S. workers displaced
from manufacturing. For reasons that I will touch on below, the demand in
this sector that cannot be met domestically will probably be met by illegal,
rather than legal immigration. In the post-industrial economy, we can also
expect more natives to be trained to provide highly-skilled services,
particularly if the jobs pay well and provide decent social status. In this
sector, the shortfall of available domestic labor is likely to increase and
immigration law is probably going to be liberalized further. Thus, the
increased concentration of managerial and bureaucratic functions in the
United States, which appears to be a predictable consequence of the

See 19 U.S.C. § 3401 (Supp. V 1993):
Upon a basis of reciprocity secured by the Agreement [NAFTA], an alien who is a
citizen of Canada or Mexico, and the spouse and children of any such alien, may, if otherwise
eligible for a visa and if otherwise admissible into the United States under the Immigration
and Nationality Act . . . be considered as classifiable as a nonimmigrant under section
101(a)(15)(E) of such Act if entering solely for a purpose specified in Section B of Annex
1603 of the Agreement ....
19.
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internationalization of business, is likely to promote additional immigration
"preferences" for well-educated, white collar workers, thus continuing a
trend that began at least twenty years ago. I foresee no significant changes
in agricultural worker policies, although regional "free trade" agreements
may expedite the procedures under which temporary agricultural labor is
permitted to enter the United States. Finally, family reunification policies
will probably not be affected at all.
B. Refugees and Asylees

Persecution has created refugees for centuries. Since the early decades
of this century, massive displacements of people driven from their
homelands by warfare and persecution have occurred with regularity.
Millions of people fled Russia and the Balkans prior to World War II, and
hundreds of thousands of others fled Germany and Austria, prompting the
League of Nations to treat the matter as one deserving international
attention.2" However, it is only in the last fifty years that refugee flow has
been recognized as a "global" phenomenon in the full sense of the word:
involving large-scale, recurrent, involuntary emigration from many countries
in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas into a broad range of "asylum"
countries, ranging from the poorest (e.g., Zaire and Burundi) to those barely
able to keep their heads above water (e.g., Pakistan) to those in the throes
of "development" (e.g., Thailand, Malaysia, and Mexico) to the established
first-world powers (including the United States); and requiring coordinated
international action to provide short- and long-term relief, physical and legal
protection, and the eventual permanent repatriation or resettlement of those
who have fled.
Bureaucrats and scholars lack the ability to distinguish clearly between
those fleeing from "persecution" (i.e., the congeries of practices employed
by nation-states to specially disadvantage or harm particular classes of
nationals) and those migrating to greener economic pastures. (In many
instances, the distinction is empty since talented people may face the
systematic denial of civil and political rights at home, yet still offer
marketable skills in the receiving country. Jewish scientists fleeing Europe
in the late 1930s and 1940s who were immediately recruited into the U.S.
20. The history of early 20th century international efforts to deal with large-scale refugee
problems is treated below in notes 24-26, and in the accompanying text.
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nuclear development program provide a good example, as do many of the
Hungarian "freedom fighters" who quickly found jobs in U.S. industry.21 )
Nevertheless, many refugee flows occur suddenly22 and generate substantial
numbers of clearly involuntary migrants-people moving across national
borders with few resources and little planning. Even if they have been
successful in their countries of origin, their skills are frequently not needed
or not readily exploited in their countries of refuge. Often disoriented,
usually at a linguistic and cultural disadvantage, they are likely to impose
significant costs on the receiving nation before they are assimilated,
resettled, or sent home. The international regime for dealing with refugee
problems, which emerged in the 1940s and 1950s and continued to develop
during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, 23 has provided a mechanism for
dealing with refugee situations swiftly while shifting some of their costs to
countries with a greater capacity to pay. It has promoted third-country
resettlement, most notably with respect to the hundreds of thousands of
refugees who left Indochina in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It has also

21.

See GIL LOESCHER & JOHN SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S

HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945-PRESENT, at 59-60 (1986) (noting that "[b]y the end of 1957, fully 65.7 percent
of the Hungarian refugees were gainfully employed, compared with 40.7 percent for the U.S. population
as a whole.").
22. The speed-and suddenness--of refugee migrations has been exemplified in 1994 by two
migrations: that of "boat people" fleeing Haiti; and the land migration of Rwandans into Zaire. The
exodus from Haiti that overwhelmed U.S. diplomacy in June and July of 1994 is addressed below, in
notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
The migration from Rwanda, which is occurring as I write, is so massive and sudden that it defies
accurate estimation. See, e.g., Rwandans Flee in Panic to Zaire, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1994, at A3
("Starting late this afternoon, refugees crossed the border at the rate of 10,000 an hour along a small road
just north of Goma, a Red Cross official estimated," and that "[b]ehind those first Rwandan refugees,
...); Raymond Bonner,
one aid worker said, there was 'a wall of people' on the 25-mile road.
Rwandan Refugees Flood Zaire as Rebel Forces Gain: Relief Agencies Overwhelmed by Influx, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 1994, at Ai0 ("More than half a million Rwandans have fled into Zaire in the last 24
hours, the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Zairian border town of Goma said late this
afternoon."); Refugees Pourinto Zaire as Rebels Gain, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at A 10 ("Aid agencies
say they are expecting between 500,000 and a million refugees. Goma has a population of about 150,000
people."); Paul Lewis, U.N. Issues New Appeal for Rwandan Cease Fire, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at
AI0 ("Even if the rebels halt their advance, diplomats and refugee officials said, the United Nations
expects 100,000 to 200,000 new refugees to reach the Zairian town of Goma alone," and that "[t]he
United Nations estimates that the total population of northwestern Rwanda has swollen to some 1.7
million, or nearly twice its normal level, with the influx of up to a million refugees. Reports from the
region indicate that Rwandans are now crossing the border into Zaire around the town of Goma at a rate
at least 2,000 an hour, with some estimates ranging to 10,000 an hour"); and The Exodus of a Nation:
200,000 Flee Rwanda Rebels in Only I Day, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 1994, at I (estimating "[t]he number
of refugees crowding Goma... at nearly a million" as of July 17, 1994).
23. See infra parts III.B-C. for a discussion of the "international refugee regime."
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exerted significant influence on a number of countries-including the United
States-to reform their asylum practices and afford greater opportunities to
those with a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion. 24
I believe that governments have more thoroughly recognized the global
dimensions of the refugee problem than any other area of immigration
policy. I also believe that governments have gone further in seeking
multilateral solutions. Nevertheless, as refugees continue to proliferate and
the Cold War becomes a distant memory, the limits of international
organizations and nations attempting to subordinate their particular interests
to more general humanitarian goals become ever more apparent. In my
view, "humanitarian admissions" are likely to remain at or slightly below
the levels achieved over the last fifteen or twenty years; measured as a
percentage of existing U.S. population, they are likely to decrease.
Particularly where asylum-seekers are concerned, the procedures employed
by the government to determine eligibility are likely to be "fairer," that is,
more "principled" and less overtly "political."
Yet, the probable
consequence of such fairness is that only a tiny percentage of millions of
asylum-seekers are going to receive permission to enter or remain in the
United States.2 5 As the effective burden of proof for each applicant rises,

24. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. 137;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(incorporating 1951 Convention definition). INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (1981), is
modeled on this definition.
25. See, for example, the following recent comment:.
I used to think that simply creating a speedy but fair asylum adjudication procedure would
be the single key for mastering the issue of political asylum, this most unruly element of
immigration policy. But with the worsening political climate, I am no longer convinced that
it will be enough, even if we could assure final and enforceable orders, positive or-negative,
within, say, twelve months of filing. Experience seems to have shown that even those
countries now operating streamlined adjudication systems with greatly augmented resources
continue to have difficulty in getting ahead of the political curve.
David Martin, Interdiction, Intervention, and the New Frontiers of Refugee Law and Policy, 33 VA. J.
INT'L L. 473, 477-81 (1993). According to Dennis Gallagher,
Third-country resettlement is likely to decline in the post-Cold War era. The United States,
the principal country of resettlement, has given preference to refugees of 'special
humanitarian concern.' Proposals to interpret this as people who have especially compelling
needs have fallen on deaf ears .... Even though the number of refugees worldwide has
grown to over 18 million, the U.S. resettlement program will probably shrink over the next
few years on the grounds that fewer refugees are of special concern to the United States. It
is unlikely that any reduction in U.S. refugee resettlement will be compensated by increases
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new attempts will be made to regularize and "internationalize" the expulsion
of the ineligible. Existing international organizations, such as the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), will assume
an expanded role. However, that role will shift (in large measure, though
not totally) from protection to repatriation.26 The number of people
seeking refuge worldwide will almost certainly increase, perhaps
dramatically. That increase, at least in the United States and Europe, is
likely to promote more restrictionism rather than greater generosity.
C. Illegal Migrants
Global factors are likely to "push" more undocumented aliens in the
direction of the U.S. border and encourage others with temporary visas to
"overstay" and remain indefinitely in an illegal status. A significant
percentage of those illegally entering or overstaying will continue to be
those fleeing violence and political upheaval in their homelands-although
most will not qualify for the limited number of refugee visas made available
each year or be able to prove the probable personal persecution necessary
to obtain "political asylum" or "withholding of deportation." With the
exception of very young and very old migrants coming to join relatives in
the United States, most of these quasi-refugees will attempt to enter the U.S.
work force. They will be joined by millions of other undocumented aliens
whose principal motives for migration will be economic. The number of
such illegals will probably rise, although there is no way of predicting with
any certainty whether the rate of increase will exceed or remain below
historical levels.
I expect the increase in illegal immigration to be fairly moderate, but
quite uneven. Quasi-refugees and those coming solely to seek work will
probably face both more rigorous enforcement of existing immigration laws
and new economic disincentives to migrate. Loopholes, however, will
in the resettlement programs of other governments, such as Canada and Australia.
Dennis Gallagher, Durable Solutions in a New Political Era, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 429, 444 (1994).
26. Interview: The Evolution of the UNHCR-Mrs. Sadako Ogata, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 419 (1994) [hereinafter The Evolution ofthe UNHCR]. "Refugee work in the
1990s should focus on the countries of origin to promote prevention. Prevention and solutions. Prevention
means looking into the countries of origin and solutions involve returning people [to their home
countries]."
Id. at 419. During the same interview, Ogata accepted without demurrer this
characterization of her earlier remarks: "You indicated earlier that the focus in the 1990s is on refugee
repatriation." Id. at 425.
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probably grow. On the other hand, traditional willingness to exploit the
labor of illegal aliens and to reap the benefits of the underground economy
to which they contribute is likely to slow-although not halt-the drive for
more effective control.
Illegal immigration results when people seeking entry find themselves
ineligible for immigrant or nonimmigrant visas, yet still manage to cross the
U.S. border. It also occurs when individuals legally in the United States as
nonimmigrants "overstay" their visas and evade detection or deportation.
Both sorts of behavior are as old as the immigration laws prohibiting them.
Despite the prohibition, there is probably as much or more incentive today
as there ever has been for aliens to enter or remain in the United States
illegally. That incentive is not likely to diminish in the foreseeable future.
For refugees, the principal incentive is fear and lack of available
alternatives. Censuses of refugees are notoriously difficult to generate since
people crossing national borders in a panic do not often register with those
patrolling those borders-and it is never clear whether all those who are
counted meet the legal definitions that governments employ to distinguish
"genuine refugees" or "asylees" from "displaced persons" or "economic
migrants." Nevertheless, it seems certain that the worldwide refugee
population, although constantly fluctuating, has remained above 10 million
for at least a decade, is now approaching or has surpassed 20 million, and
is almost certain to rise." Political and ethnic turmoil in much of Africa,
the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East gives no sign
of diminishing. Closer to home, instability in Haiti generated boat people
at an unprecedented rate, 2 a new boatlift from Cuba seems highly likely,
29
and Mexican politics have taken a new and dangerous turn.

27. The most authoritative recent estimate of current refugee population-which is already badly
outdated-is the figure of 19 million offered by the UNHCR. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 22, and infra notes 43-44, and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Andrew Reding, Chiapas is Mexico, 11 WORLD POL'Y J. It, 11-25 (1994).
According to Reding, the 1993 "Zapatista" uprising in Chiapas province was not an isolated event, but
a sign of deep political trouble in Mexico. He argues that "[r]epression or the threat of repression is a
fact of life throughout rural Mexico" and that incipient revolution has emerged often, only to be crushed
brutally.
In 1968, after students began marching to demand a greater measure of democracy, the army
attacked a gathering in Mexico City's Tlateloco Square with tanks and automatic weapons.
Hundreds were killed, hundreds more imprisoned. In the ensuing years, the armies brigadas
blancas kidnapped suspected dissidents, hundreds of whom were never heard from again.
And in the early 1970s, the army forces crushed a peasant rebellion in the state of Guerrero
with a scorched-earth policy that made little distinction between combatants and civilians.
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The continuation (and probable expansion) of the refugee crisis is certain
to create more immigration pressure. With increasing frequency, refugees
from almost every region have sought safety in the West. According to one
source, "despite deterrent measures, the number of asylum applications in
Europe, North America, and Australia rose more than sevenfold from an
estimated 100,000 in 1983 to about 715,900 in 1991 .... Indeed, between
1983 and mid-1992, over 3 million people sought asylum in the
industrialized states. ' ' 30 At least 409,000 of these applicants-nearly oneseventh of the total-sought admission to the United States. 31 Given new
restrictionist pressures in Europe and Canada, the percentage is likely to
hold steady or rise in the future.
The pool of potential labor migrants is many times larger than the pool
of putative refugees-and is likely to grow at an even more rapid rate, with
predictable consequences along the border. According to Francisco Alba:
In a world that is becoming smaller due to closer relations among
countries, the pool of available labor is becoming larger.
One indicator of an increasingly competitive labor situation
worldwide is the population that is of working age. The future size
Hundreds were killed, hundreds more imprisoned. In the ensuing years, the armies brigadas
blancas kidnapped suspected dissidents, hundreds of whom were never heard from again.
And in the early 1970s, the army forces crushed a peasant rebellion in the state of Guerrero
with a scorched-earth policy that made little distinction between combatants and civilians.
There is therefore nothing out of the ordinary in the army's response to the uprising in
Chiapas. As in other cases of 'subversion,' it has bombed and strafed villages, executed
captives, and detained and tortured civilian dissidents.
That the army has not had to rely on these methods more regularly is a testament to the
success of a second method of constraining democracy: electoral fraud.
Id. at 18, 19.
What is arguably different today is an intensified demand by the electorate for truly representative
elections, tremendous cynicism about the goals and economic program of the ruling political party, the
PRI, and widespread political restiveness, which may have been exemplified by the assassination of the
PRI's candidate for the presidency in the national elections slated for August 1994.
Thus, Reding, in a recent Op-Ed piece, argued that "Mexico is headed for a political crisis" and
asserted that "[a] clean election is essential to the success of the North American Free Trade Agreement
and the stability of our populous neighbor. If Mexican democracy falters, we may have to prepare for
a flood of refugees across our southern border." Andrew Reding, Mexico on the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 1994, at AI5.
30. GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY:
REFUGEE CRISIS 97-99 (1993).

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL

31. See id. at 98. According to this table, which includes the years 1983 through 1991, 409,900
of these applicants sought asylum in the United States, 212,000 in Canada, and 2,192,400 in the IGC
countries (i.e., industrialized countries of northern Europe). Id. at 98.
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of the working-age population-those between 15 and 65 years of
age-can be precisely estimated. United Nations data reveal that in
1960 there were 1.146 billion working-age individuals in the lessdeveloped countries. This population had nearly doubled (to 2.155
billion) by 1985 and will reach approximately 3.010 billion by the
year 2000.
In developed countries, the working-age populations tend to be
smaller and increase at slower rates. This group will only expand
by 50 percent between 1960 and 2000, from 595 to 842 million
individuals. The contrast between the developed and less-developed
countries is even more noteworthy if we compare the patterns
anticipated to occur over the next fifteen years. In the developed
countries, the working-age population will increase by 60 million
between 1985 and 2000, while the less-developed countries will add
855 million persons to their working-age populations over the same
fifteen-year span.3 2
The huge disparity revealed by these statistics does not mean that most
of the newcomers to the world labor market will migrate from their country
of origin to seek work. Nor does it mean that all those who do will be
unwelcome: particularly in times of prosperity, industrialized countries with
low birth rates have frequently depended on foreign laborers to take jobs
that would otherwise go begging.
Nevertheless, the number of foreign workers ready, willing, and able to
migrate to the United States and other developed countries is growing
rapidly, and is likely to increase in the future. In many underdeveloped and
developing countries, there is a substantial "labor surplus" that shows no
signs of diminishing. Clearly, such a surplus exists in a number of countries
that have long histories of sending laborers to the United States, including
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and the Republic of Ireland.
However, the paradigmatic case remains Mexico. Trejo Reyes, writing in
the late 1980s and using official Mexican and Banco de Mexico labor force
documents, has estimated that under every likely economic projection,
Mexico will run a substantial "employment deficit" for the foreseeable
future:

32. Francisco Alba, Migrant Labor Supply and Demand in Mexico and the United States: A
Global Perspective, in U.S.-MEXICo RELATIONS: LABOR MARKET INTERDEPENDENCE 243, 250 (Jorge
A. Bustamante et al. ed., 1992).
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The size of the employment deficit in 2000 under the observed
tendencies is rather large. In the most pessimistic case . . . the
deficit would grow from 2.3 million jobs in 1985 to 12.5 million
jobs in 2000. That is, only 1.4 million jobs would be created during
the whole period, compared to 800,000, the number needed every
year simply to keep the employment deficit constant in absolute
terms. Even in the most optimistic case... during the fifteen-year
period only 7 million jobs would be created-that is, about 467,000
new jobs annually, or slightly more than half of the new jobs
required simply to keep the employment deficit at its current
absolute level. The resulting employment deficit in the three cases
would be 12.2, 10.6, and 8.4 million jobs in the year 2000."3
Although many commentators believe that the North American Free Trade
Agreement will eventually raise productivity and wages in Mexico, thus
reducing long-term emigration pressures, virtually no one has argued that the
projected turn-around will come quickly. Instead, many of the proponents
of NAFTA have suggested that one of the short-term effects of the
agreement will be increased labor migration 3 4 -or, at least, an increasing
33.

Saul Trejo Reyes, Mexican-American Employment Relations: The Mexican Context, in U.S.LABOR MARKET INTERDEPENDENCE 257, 266 (Jorge A. Bustamante et al. ed.,

MEXICO RELATIONS:

1992).
34. Frequently, the problem is presented as a short-term one that will particularly affect a few
industries. See, e.g., Kathleen Rees et al., The PotentialEffects of NAFTA on the Textile and Apparel
Industry in the United States, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES 239, 242 (Khoshrow Fatemi ed., 1993). "In the short run, domestic industry may suffer a
structural transfer of labor resulting from lower wages in Mexico and preferential access of apparel

imports to the United States under NAFTA."
Sometimes, it is presented as a much longer-term problem. Sydney Weintraub, for example,
explains:
[W]hile [labor provisions were] not explicitly included, many Americans support NAFTA
because they are convinced that economic development is the only sure way to slow down
undocumented immigration from Mexico. Is this a vain hope? It probably is, for the short
term; but it may not be for the long term ....
It is hard to define the long term. It could
take more than 100 years for per capita incomes in the two countries to equalize, but this may
not be necessary to reduce the incentive to emigrate. If income and employment in Mexico
were on a steady upward path, coupled with more equal distribution of the benefits than in
the past, this sense of hope for the future may be sufficient to staunch emigration pressures.
Sydney Weintraub, The Coming Debate on NAFTA, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 18, 29 (Khoshrow Fatemi ed., 1993).

An even more pessimistic view is asserted by R. Hinosa Ojeda and Robert McCleery, U.S.-Mexico
Interdependence, Social Pacts, and Policy Perspectives: A Computable General EquilibriumApproach,
in U.S.-MEXICo RELATIONS: LABOR MARKET INTERDEPENDENCE 113, 134 (Jorge A. Bustamante et al.

ed., 1992).
The neo-liberal alternative, which is modeled on current policy directions in the United States
and Mexico, implies a free trade agreement, continued debt servicing, and restrictive
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number of attempts to cross the U.S. border in the face of a more rigorous
enforcement effort.
Although global phenomena largely explain the departure of most
"illegals," their reception in the United States is now-and is likely to
remain-a local phenomenon, driven largely by considerations of costs,
benefits, and political impact. That reception has both formal and informal
aspects. With several very important exceptions-including the bracero
program that flourished in the 1950s and early 1960s, the so-called "Texas
proviso" to the Immigration and Nationality Act that used to protect the U.S.
employers of illegal aliens, and the "amnesty" and Replacement Agricultural
Worker provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) 3 5-the
formal response to future refugees and work-seeking
migrants has been restrictive. Thus, as a general matter, the only migrants
welcome are those who are brought from abroad as "refugees" under
geographically and numerically limited annual "allocations," or who survive
the rigorous screening imposed on asylum (and withholding of deportation)
applicants, or who qualify for the limited number of employment-related
immigration visas, or who meet the very demanding requirements
established for those seeking permission to work as non-immigrants in the
United States. The law requires that everyone else be sent home.
The informal response has always been more generous-although only
selectively so. Since Michael Piore argued in 1979 that a "de facto"
immigration "system" exists side-by-side with the de jure system, 6 it has
immigration (at least in intent) A la IRCA [Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986].
We show that changes in trade policies, as opposed to capital and labor policies, generally
have smaller impacts on production and welfare. A [free trade agreement] by itself is not
capable of reducing migration as some have claimed. Migration, in fact, will increase
substantially in the absence of significant capital inflows to increase employment and wages
in Mexico.
Id.
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 18, at 963. Johnson cites GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
ScHorr, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT 26 (rev. ed. 1993), which is probably the most frequently cited study
in the NAFTA literature. He also notes that Doris Meissner, now Commissioner of the INS, expressed
a similar view in 1992. See Doris Meissner, Managing Migrations, 86 FOREIGN POL'Y 66, 82 (1992).
35. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359.
36. See generally MICHAEL PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETIES (1979). As Piore notes, de facto policy is made at the administrative level by the INS and
other enforcement agencies. Id. at 172-78. It is responsive to "citizens' complaints and ... [to] the
pattern of political pressure as it is revealed in the history of immigration policy and in... day-to-day
relationships with elected officials." Id. at 176. It reveals a "sensitivity to workers in competition with
natives" and "to employers' needs," and frequently bends the law in favor of vocal constituencies. Id.
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been commonplace in U.S. immigration scholarship to highlight the
discrepancy between "book law" and the real-world practices of the INS and
other enforcement agencies. Particularly among commentators focusing on
the labor market and espousing a Marxist or neo-Marxist perspective, the
"contradictions" between stated legislative purpose and real-world policy
implementation have assumed a fundamental importance, with some arguing
that the discrepancy exists to promote the economic interests of employers
and to permit the "superexploitation" of their employees.37 Implicit in this

Piore sees the two systems as separate but overlapping. Thus, he notes that "the de jure immigration
system has not been nearly as divorced from the prevailing de facto system as the term 'illegal' suggests
and has actually provided a variety of channels through which those who become permanent settlers and
have children can regularize their status." Id. at 177-78.
37. Kitty Calavita has consistently argued the first position. She has chronicled the key role
played by industrialists and politicians, first, in shaping early'U.S. immigration policy, and second, in
blocking later attempts to minimize foreign recruitment via de jure restrictions on the employment of
"contract labor." See generally KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF
LABOR: 1820-1924 (1984). In a later work, she distinguishes between the merely "rhetorical" and real
consequences of the contract labor laws. KiTTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
IMMIGRATION, AND THE l.N.S. 4-5 (1992). Yet, in her analysis of the bracero program, she finds:
a "state" that is fragmented across institutional lines, at least in the short term and close up;
that faces contradictions not just from without but from within as well; and that sets policies
less according to some grand plan to rescue the political economy than in response to
immediate institutional needs....
While it is true that INS policies usually advanced the interests of growers, close attention to
the archival record reveals that this was neither because the agency was coopted by
agricultural interests, as instrumentalists would have it, nor because of a direct "objective
relation" between the state and capital, as structuralists would maintain. Rather, the
Immigration Service pursued growers' interest in a generous bracero system at least in part
to realize its own.
Id. at 9.
For an example of the second, more radical perspective, see Marlene Dixon et al.,
Reindustrialization and the Transnational Labor Force in the United States Today, in THE NEW
NOMADS: FROM IMMIGRANT LABOR TO TRANSNATIONAL WORKING CLASS 101-115 (Marlene Dixon &
Suzanne Jonas eds., 1982):
Both in regard to the U.S. and the capitalist world more generally, we are focusing on
a phase in the world-historic process of capital accumulation. The obverse side of this process
is what Braverman describes as the incessant "transformation of working humanity into a
'labor force,' a 'factor of production,' an instrument of capital." ...
We view this
'accumulation of misery' as occuring on two levels.
I. The creation of a relative surplus population, "a population of greater extent than
suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital." The existence of a reserve
army of labor (i.e., a variable proportion of the labor force which may be employed when
capital has a need for labor, and unemployed when the need declines) is not only a product,
but indeed a condition or necessity, for capitalist expansion and capital accumulation; and its
existence is a condition for the devaluation and degradation of the employed sector or waged
labor.
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argument is the belief that the INS will overlook illegal immigration when
it suits the interests of employers-and enforce the law when it does not.3"
A more moderate reading of the history-which I personally
favor-suggests that not all employers have the same interests, that the
interests they do have are subject to change, and that to the extent they
present a unified front, they are but one interest group among many. Yet
it appears indisputable that most employers favor relatively "open"
immigration most of the time and that, historically, they have had
considerable influence in either moderating restrictive legislation or
persuading the government to ease up on enforcement efforts. There is no
reason to doubt that employers will pursue similar objectives in the future,
sometimes with success.
Interest-group analyses of refugee policy, including my own co-authored
book, also reveal distinctions between de jure and de facto policy and
suggest that powerful lobbies inside and outside government can influence
decision-making.39 Facially neutral laws can and have been administered

2. Even within the employed population, and therefore independently of capitalist crisis,
the secular product of capital accumulation is the devaluation and degradation of waged labor.
Taylorization has meant not only a change in the labor process itself (deskilling,
intensification, etc.), but also an actual cheapening of labor power, as highly skilled work has
been reduced to unskilled, and highly paid workers have been replaced by cheap, unskilled
labor. These tendencies can be seen statistically in the fact that skilled, highly-paid workers
are being unemployed, while the participation of lower-paid women and immigrants is
increasing; overall, then, for the working population as a whole, wage levels are being
lowered rather than raised.
Further, we would argue, the tendency of this process is to subject an ever larger sector
of the U.S. labor force to superexploitation, that is, to a reduction of wages below the level
necessary for the production and reproduction of labor power.
Id. at 101.
38. See, e.g., PIORE, supra note 36.
As several scholars have now pointed out, our policy toward Mexican immigrants has varied
in blatant fashion with U.S. business cycles and the requirements of particular U.S. industries.
Thus, immigration was ignored in the twenties and during World War II and the postwar
boom. But the policy was reversed, often in a brutal and repressive fashion, in the 1930s and
in the post-Korean recession. The reversal involved the repatriation of more than one million
Mexicans but was accompanied by the introduction of the bracero program, which was
designed to cushion the impact upon agricultural businesses.
Id. at 177.
This "business cycle" argument poses no difficulties if we assume-as Piore does-that the shortterm interests of business are changeable and that the immigration process also takes into account the
interests of non-business groups, such as displaced U.S. workers. It would be highly problematic were
we to assume that the deep logic of capitalism requires employers to foster unlimited competition for jobs
in order to lower wages and promote "superexploitation."
39. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 21 passim; see also L. GERSON, THE HYPHENATE IN
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with considerable partiality to favor some groups. Although ideology
accounts for some of the difference, well-organized ethnic interests have also
played a role. Soviet Jews and Cubans, for example, both benefitted from
prevailing anti-communist sentiments within the government, but also from
effective lobbying on their behalf. Usually, interest-group pressures have
resulted in special legislation,' promulgation of favorable administrative
guidelines, 4' discretionary implementation of those guidelines on behalf of
a particular group, or favorable exercise of administrative discretion in the
absence of explicit guidelines.42 Occasionally, they have led enforcement
agencies to ignore widespread violations of the underlying statute and permit
the arrival and continued residence of undocumented aliens. Since 1980, for
example, virtually every Cuban arriving on U.S. shores has been granted
political asylum or shielded from deportation. The only significant
exceptions are those with prior criminal records in Cuba or those involved
in criminal activity after arrival here. As long as Cuban-Americans play a
decisive role in Florida electoral politics, we can expect such favorable
treatment to continue.4 3

RECENT AMERICAN POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY (1964) (although not focused on the issue of refugee

admissions, nor even exclusively on immigration, Gerson's work provides probably the best example of
an interest-based study of U.S. immigration policy); ROBERT DIVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY

(1957) (employing a more eclectic methodology, Divine also does a good job of taking interests into
account).
40. See, e.g., Act of November 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966), which granted "conditional
permanent resident" status to Cubans otherwise ineligible for naturalization.
41. For example, after strenuous lobbying and considerable pressure from the State Department,
guidelines were adopted in 1980 for processing indochinese refugees, dropping a requirement favored
by the INS whereby each potential refugee admissible under INA § 207 would have been required
personally to demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution." See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note
21, at 198-201.
42. See, e.g., LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 21 (in particular, chapters 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 note
that the best example of such generosity was probably the use of executive "parole" to bring more than
a million Hungarians, Cubans, and Indochinese to the United States from 1956 through 1980).
43. Haitians, who began arriving by boat in significant numbers only in 1980, have nowhere near
the same political or economic power in Florida. In addition, they come to the United States with a
number of immediate disadvantages: they are poor, black, frequently illiterate, and usually speak neither
English nor Spanish. They also have been identified as a group peculiarly susceptible to AIDS. It is
therefore not surprising that the U.S. government treats them totally differently from their Cuban
counterparts. See. e.g., Terry Atlas, Haiti Boat People To Be Put In Camps, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 1994,
at I (quoting William Gray III, President Clinton's adviser on Haiti: "Those who take to the boats will
not have resettlement possibilities in the United States."); Michael R. Gordon, In Policy Shift, U.S. Will
Admit No Haitians at Seas, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at Al. For an account of the early history of
differential treatment of Cubans and Haitians, see LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 2 1; NORMAN L.
ZUCKER, THE GUARDED GATE (1987).
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Yet, even migration patterns established over the course of time are not
immune to domestic challenge. Large labor surpluses or substantial refugee
problems in, traditional "sending countries" and uncertain economic
prospects in traditional "receiving countries" can create a volatile situation.
The substantial migration of Mexican laborers to the United States is a "hot"
political issue that is likely to become even hotter in the decades to come.
The mass migration of thousands of Haitian and Cuban "boat people" in
1980 created substantial anti-refugee backlash in the early 1980s; the recent
outpouring of thousands of new Haitian "boat people" over a three-week
period induced the Clinton administration to refuse admission to anyone
leaving that island by sea."
Of course, change can also lead in the direction of more generosity.
Thus, a fairly general amnesty could be declared again for illegal aliens
already present in the United States and those "amnestied" could be granted
the opportunity to obtain U.S. permanent residence;45 the INS could relax
its enforcement effort generally or along particular segments of the border;
particular groups of asylum seekers could be offered conditional permanent
residence,46 temporary "safe haven"47 or more limited de facto relief from

44. The decision to refuse to permit Haitian "boat people" to seek political asylum is a reversion
to the policy adopted during the Bush administration and pursued during the first year of the Clinton
administration. It does feature "liberal" elements not available earlier, including expanded opportunities
for Haitians to apply for political asylum at the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince and new resettlement
opportunities in Panama and other regional States. It was prompted by a sudden mass exodus. See
supra note 22.
According to the Chicago Tribune, "More than 13,000 Haitians-nearly 5,000 (in a two-day
period]-have taken to sea in desperate attempts to flee their impoverished nation in the three weeks
since the U.S. halted its policy of automatically returning those intercepted at sea." Atlas, supra note
43, at 1.
45. According to Stephen Legomsky, "[a]pproximately 1.8 million aliens applied for temporary
resident alien status under the general legalization program" established by the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Nearly 98% of these applications were approved. STEPHEN LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 549 (1992). Another 1.3 million aliens otherwise ineligible for visas
applied for legalization under IRCA's special agricultural provisions. Id. at 552.
46. This status was available for a limited number of applicants (never exceeding 17,400) each
year between 1965 and 1980 under the former "seventh preference," which was codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1153(a)(7) (1965) (repealed 1980).
47. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 302, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C § 1254(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) created a new temporary status for individuals fleeing
ongoing armed conflict, environmental disasters, and other "extraordinary and temporary conditions" that
prevent safe return. This provision, which must be invoked by the Attorney General on behalf of a
particular group, provides "temporary protected status" for a period of 6 to 18 months. It has been
employed on behalf of Salvadorans (after considerable lobbying and special Congressional legislation),
Kuwaitis, Liberians, and Lebanese. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 45, at 974-77.

1994]

A

VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES

deportation;48 and the practice of granting special "diversity" visas could
be continued and expanded.49 It would be presumptuous to argue that
none of these things will occur in the next several decades; there is no way
of predicting every future migration pressure or all of the vagaries of U.S.
response to such pressure.
However, I believe that the general trend will be toward tighter rather
than looser borders, with more effort put into the apprehension of illegal
aliens at the border and their detection and deportation after arrival. As has
almost always been the case, the enforcement commitment will be expressed
more unequivocally in writing than in the actions of the bureaucrats charged
with implementing policy. Nonetheless, I think the gap between de jure law
and de facto practice is likely to narrow significantly. I base this prediction
on a number of facts and assumptions (many of which I have already set
out) about global demography, the global economy, and social, political, and
economic trends in the United States.
1. Demographic Considerations
The developing and underdeveloped worlds are continuing to generate
vast numbers of surplus workers and refugees. Although some ongoing
immigration is probably necessary to balance declining nativity rates in the
West (including the United States), there is clearly a worldwide oversupply
of laborers tiat is likely to get worse. The refugee population is also
growing rapidly. Developments in transportation and communication
(including new versions of informal peonage and the elaboration of
smuggling networks to bring undocumented people across national borders)
enable an increasing number of people from almost everywhere in the world
to reach the United States and other developed nations.

48. Legomsky has chronicled the "inventive" non-statutory remedy, and "extended voluntary
departure," which the U.S. government employed on at least 16 occasions between 1960 and 1981.
LEGOMSKY, supra note 45, at 972-74. This remedy frequently overlapped with the grant of executive
"parole," a discretionary remedy originally authorized by § 21 2(d)(5) of the INA of 1952, but extended
beyond recognition as an admissions device for refugees during the period beginning with the Hungarian
uprising in 1956 and nominally ending with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. See generally
LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 21.
49. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 131, 104 Stat. 4978,4997 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) created 55,000 annual "diversity visas" to be distributed
among applicants from "low-admission" regions of the world and "low-admission" countries within these
regions.
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2. Social and Political Considerations
In recent years, immigrants have tended to concentrate in California,
Texas, Florida, and the New York-New Jersey area. Such concentration
may be a predictable result of the restructuring of the U.S. economy. It may
help revitalize some urban areas, 50 and may even produce long-term
national and regional benefits; yet it clearly imposes heavy short-term local
costs by burdening health care and educational systems and forcing
municipalities and state governments to pay for social benefits that are not
directly recoverable in taxes or reimbursements from the federal government.
The heavy concentration of immigrants in a few locations probably
magnifies concerns about immigration in those locations while permitting
it to remain a background, low-priority political issue in most of the nation.
Thus, California, Texas, and Florida are likely to continue to argue for a
more restrictionist policy and aggressively pursue reimbursement for their
costs,51 while the subject is likely to be a matter of relative indifference in

50. See SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY 315 (1991), stating:
[I]mmigration is a factor in the occupation of areas both in New York in the 1970s and in
London in the 1960s that would otherwise have had a high proportion of abandoned housing
and closed stores. Through the immigrant community, immigrants become agents actively
engaged in rehabilitating both spatial and economic sectors of the city. The immigrant
community can be seen as representing a small-scale investment of direct labor (through
neighborhood upgrading) and of capital (through neighborhood commerce) in a city's
economy. Another way of putting it is that the immigrant community is a structure or vehicle
that maximizes the benefits of individual investments of direct labor and money for the
community, by concentrating such investments spatially, a concentration effected by
residential segregation. Thus, home repairs by multiple households become neighborhood
upgrading; differences of language and food create a captive market for ethnic shopkeepers.
Id.
51.

See, e.g., L.A. TIMEs. July 3, 1994, at Al:
In large U.S. cities, mothers too poor to pay-including undocumented ones-have their
babies in hospitals at public expense.
All children in America, citizens or not, may attend public schools. In every town on
the Mexican border, without exception, the schools are woefully overcrowded.
A research group in Washington, the Center for Immigration Studies, says illegal aliens
cost the nation about $7 billion a year in medical, educational and other services. This is the
main complaint of the various groups formed to curb immigration.

"We're just giving away America," said Glenn Spencer, a spokesman for one such

California group called Act Now. "We have too soft a heart."
Florida claims to spend $1.5 billion a year on social services for about 373,000 illegal
immigrants. Its governor argues that this is a federal problem and has sued the government
to collect. Texas, with 405,000, and California, with 1.6 million, have filed similar lawsuits.
The cost estimates presented in the story are much higher than those generated by earlier studies, many
of which find net economic benefits from immigration to the economy as a whole and to the fisc.
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Indiana, North Dakota, or Idaho. On balance though, present migration
patterns (which almost certainly will continue) probably enhance
restrictionist pressures because the states with the highest concentration of
immigrants control at least forty percent of the House of Representatives.52
3. Economic Considerations
Fluctuations in the U.S. economy will affect immigration policy and law
as they always have. High domestic unemployment will promote more
restrictionist sentiment and lessen employer demand for alternative sources
of labor; low domestic unemployment will diminish (although not eliminate)
restrictionist sentiment and will increase employer demand for alternative
sources of labor.
Structural changes in the U.S. economy-which are clearly related to the
globalization of markets-are likely to be even more important. The deindustrialization of the West is likely to continue (although it appears that
labor-intensive, underground-economy "sweatshop" and light assembly jobs
are re-emerging), as will the mechanization of agriculture. The high-end
service sector will continue to grow, but its needs are likely to be met
through the expansion of relatively narrow legal immigration channels; the

It should be noted that anti-immigrant sentiment in California does not end with suits for
compensation. Thus, the same story also notes:
California Republican Gov. Pete Wilson, campaigning for reelection, would amend the
Constitution to deny citizenship to native-born children of undocumented mothers.
He also favors an initiative on the November ballot that would deny a public education
and all but emergency health care to illegal immigrants.
Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) wants to call out the National Guard to seal the Mexican
border.
Her Democratic colleague, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, who as mayor of San Francisco was
a champion of immigrants, now wants to buy tougher border control with a $1 toll on every
person who crosses. About 56 million a year cross legally at San Diego, the world's busiest
port of entry. Illegal crossers, of course, do not stop at toll booths.
Id.
52. According to the INS, 973,977 immigrants in 1992 indicated their "statistical area of
intended residence." Of these, more than 34% indicated an intent to settle in one of the nation's ten
largest metropolitan areas. More than 13% indicated an intent to settle in Los Angeles and a similar
number registered New York City as their choice. Immigrants Admittedfor Top 10 Metropolitan Areas
of Intended Residence: 1992, in THE WORLD ALMANAC 370 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1994).
Of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives, California has been apportioned 52; New York,
31; Texas, 30; Florida, 23; Illinois, 20; and New Jersey, 13. These 169 seats from only six states
constitute 39% of the total. Congressional Apportionment, in THE WORLD ALMANAC 360 (Robert
Famighetti ed., 1994).
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low-end service sector will probably continue to grow, although some lowend jobs (data entry, for example) are being exported overseas. With
respect to these low-end jobs: a) a significant percentage will be taken by
U.S. workers displaced from industry; b) a significant percentage will be in
the underground economy and will recruit part-time and casual labor
(including immigrants) in order to minimize the cost of benefits and
government regulation; and c) the attractiveness of casual labor will depend,
to some extent at least, on new costs that may be legislatively imposed (e.g.,
national health insurance), and on the ability and willingness of the
government to enforce its regulatory and employer-contribution laws. To
take one example: any national health insurance scheme requiring universal
coverage and employer contribution will probably discourage the
employment of undocumented aliens and other casual laborers if it is widely
enforced, and if the penaltiesfor non-compliance are sufficiently severe; if
it is not enforced, or the penalties provide no real deterrent, then, all other
things being equal, it will continue to be rational to hire undocumented
aliens.
It seems unlikely that the incentives to hire undocumented aliens will
disappear in the near future-in fact, they may grow. When combined with
the continuing growth of the world's refugee population and its increasing
surplus of people seeking employment, continuing illegal immigration at a
fairly high level is a virtual certainty. Some of that illegal migration will
probably receive a wink and a nod from governmental officials who will be
more concerned about the political symbolism of highly-visible enforcement
activities along the border and well-publicized (but necessarily selective)
enforcement of existing "employer sanctions" laws than about net migration
statistics. Nevertheless, existing pressures on the government "to do
something about immigration"-a demand that usually ignores motives for
departure, the niceties of entry status, and the long-term economic
consequences of immigration policy-are not going to go away. In my
view, more effective enforcement of a body of law that looks a good deal
like the one we have today is highly probable. Fewer undocumented people
will slip across the border, and more of those who do will be caught and
deported. Where illegal immigration is concerned, the inevitable gap
between stated policy and actual implementation is likely to narrow.
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III. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

More legal opportunities for highly-skilled and well-educated foreigners
to migrate to the United States; a fairer but probably less generous refugee
policy; and more effective but far from complete control over illegal
immigration, are hardly negligible consequences. However, they do not add
up to major revisions in the criteria employed by this country to select its
immigrants, the number of immigrants actually welcomed, or the procedures
governing their admission, exclusion, or deportation. More importantly, the
changes I have described, if they occur, will leave intact several powerful,
but somewhat misleading, impressions: first, that immigration to the United
States is regulated exclusively by the United States; second, that immigration
policy and its uneven successes are a matter of national rather than
internationalpractice; and third, that the frontier dividing the "American"
"us" from the vast "un-American" "them," however often it has been
breached, is an artifact constructed by Congress, the courts, and INS out of
domestic policy concerns, a parochial legal tradition, and U.S.-made barbed
wire.
I believe that our sense of a national frontier very similar to the one we
have had for more than a century will persist into the foreseeable future. I
believe that this sense will be largely, but not entirely, justified by this
course of events. Thus, the "fairly modem social practices" identified by
Mitchell as establishing that frontier-including "continuous barbed wire
fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspections, currency control, and so
on"5S-are likely to persist without major change and will help sustain our
confidence in the primacy of that "almost transcendental entity, the nationstate."'
Yet, the monopoly of the nation-state over immigration affairs need
not-and probably cannot--be quite as absolute as "statist" (or "neostatist")" models of international affairs tend to assume. Nation-states

53.
54.

Mitchell, supra note I, at 94.
Id. at 94.

55. Mitchell, supra note 1. As his title, The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and
Their Choices, suggests, Mitchell does not reify the State. Instead, he argues that "the State" is an
intellectual construction-a "framework"-which is never totally separate from the concrete practices of
statesmen, politicians, bureaucrats, and the like. Thus, it only "appears to stand apart from the social
world and provide an external structure," and is not really a "transcendental entity,"-although
appearances obviously count for a great deal. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
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probably never established their immigration policies unilaterally, certainly
do not do so now, and are not likely to do so in the future. Similar or
complementary interests often have promoted a search for common solutions
to problems extending across national borders. Over the last half century
or so, States have begun to institutionalize various forms of cooperation
relating to the transnational movement of refugees and labor migrants. An
elaborate "international refugee regime"56 has emerged, which has helped
coordinate the responses of traditional "receiving" countries to the
misfortune so common in their more benighted neighbors. In some parts of
the world, the degree of cooperation on labor migration-particularly over
the last decade-has made significant ideological and institutional inroads
on traditional notions of national sovereignty. These developments are
meaningful. They give globalists some reason to hope. But particularly if
they are looking at U.S. policy, they would be wise not to hope for too
much.
A. The Persistenceof the State and of Local Interests
My skepticism derives from my belief that States will continue to
exercise sovereign prerogatives as long as they believe it is in their interest
to do so. Global events,57 by definition, invite coordinated multilateral

Nevertheless, appearances can sometimes be deceiving. When Mitchell speaks of a nation
"establishing a territorial boundary and exercising absolute control over movement across it," he is not
really speaking of State practicetout court. Instead, he is speaking of a State's aspirations,coupled with
practices that promote the goal of "control," but inevitably fall short of achieving it completely. Id. at
94 (emphasis added).
56. LOESCHER, supra note 30. See also CLAUDENA SKRAN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
REGIME AND THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN EUROPE (forthcoming). See.generally Gil Loescher, The
InternationalRefugee Regime, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 337 (1994).
For a discussion of what the "international refugee regime" is, how it has functioned, and what its
prospects are for the future, see infra part III.B-F.
57. The term "global events" requires some sort of definition. I will suggest that they are events,
standing in some relationship to one another, that occur simultaneously or in close temporal proximity,
and that occur either entirely or in significant measure outside the boundaries of any State, or within
several States, events that either implicate the interests of many States, or have the clear potential of
doing so, and that defy clear unilateral solution.
Examples of "global events" include the pollution of the oceans or the earth's atmosphere, the
AIDS pandemic, the dissemination of information or political propaganda via a worldwide
communications web, and the exchange of capital and goods within an international economic framework
that permits buyers and sellers, borrowers and lenders from almost every country in the world to
participate in the market. With respect to immigration, they include all of the factors that either permit
or promote the international movement of refugees and job-seekers, or facilitate that movement.
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responses. Indeed, from an Olympian perspective, they may require the
subordination of local and immediate interests to some supranational
authority for the. good of all. Yet people live in nation-states, not on
Olympus. If those States are democratically governed, as all of the western
industrialized States confronting large-scale immigration are, they cannot
ignore the concerns of the electorate. Since they are complex bureaucracies,
they cannot ignore the concerns of civil servants or organized pressure
groups either. No immigration policy can satisfy everybody. But no State
can afford to pursue a policy that does not promise clear benefits to enough
of its constituents, if not immediately, then in the near future. Doing good
for the world at large-or at least for some of its most desperate and
vulnerable people-is a value that has been internalized by a number of
societies, the United States included.5 8 For that value to prevail, however,
doing good must be associated with the probability of the people at home
doing wel159-- or at least doing better than otherwise would be likely.
Coordinated or collective international policies that meet this test are
politically defensible and can achieve considerable stability and even grow,
but multilateral or global policies that fly in the face of important local
interests will fail.
The current worldwide immigration situation presents problems that cry
out for joint action. Yet it also presents the strong possibility that most
actions pursued jointly will fall well short of their goals or fail completely.
The likelihood of failure, the short-term costs of generosity, and the threat
to sovereignty of many "global solutions" almost guarantee that international
cooperation will be limited, and that except where strong economic or
security concerns dictate otherwise, it will focus more heavily on
immigration restriction than on additional admission opportunities.
Clearly, such international cooperation will begin with the assumption
that too many people are on the move. Thus, it will point to massive and

58. See, e.g., John Scanlan & O.T. Kent, The Forceof Moral Argumentsfor a Just Immigration
Policy in a Hobbesian Universe: The Contemporary American Example, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED
SOCIETIES? THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 61-107 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988).
59. See, e.g., Aristide Zolberg, Commentary on Current Refugee Issues, in 47 J. INT'L AFF. 341,
343 (1994).
States are not by nature, generous. Nothing happens if you wait for generosity or for the state
to exercise moral obligation. But I think liberal states do have an obligation of asylum and
a very important one. And I think this is the only ground we can have to have a really strong
and generous refugee regime. But this kind of obligation is much more likely to be carried
out when it is to your political advantage to do so.
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imperfectly controlled migration from numerous countries of origin to
virtually every developed country in the world-and also to those lessdeveloped countries that can provide a better prospect of work or personal
safety. The overabundance of asylum applicants has already been noted, as
has the rapidly expanding number of people from the Third World seeking
to enter the international workforce. According to Arthur Helton:
[an]
unprecedented number of refugees are fleeing
persecution-approximately 19 million, according to the-United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). An additional
24 million people are displaced within their own countries, due to
armed conflict or forced relocation. These are only part of the
estimated 100 million migrants worldwide who move for a variety
of reasons, ranging from poverty and economic insecurity to
population growth and environmental degradation.'
We can elaborate Helton's list of causes (or factors directly contributing
to international migration) to include widespread famine, the transformation
of economies from an agricultural to an industrial base or from an industrial
to a service base, rampant nationalism and ethnic intolerance, and warfare
that either involves several nations or has the potential of sending refugees
and displaced persons across the borders of several nations. Or, we can list
all of the phenomena that facilitate such migration, such as the
establishment of transnational communication and transportation networks.
And we can argue-validly, I think-that the only way to render migration
"manageable" (i.e., acceptable to immigrant-receiving nations in terms of
both numbers and mode of entry) is to address these "root causes" and
related facilitating phenomena. It is likely that any academic attempt to
"solve" any of these problems would denude entire forests, generate
immense controversy, and, in all likelihood, result in little or no consensus
about costs, benefits, implementation, strategy, or probable success.
Political consensus, particularly consensus involving a substantial number
of nations, is even more unlikely.6'

60. Arthur C. Helton, Displacement and Human Rights: Current Dilemmas in Refugee
Protection, in 47 J. INT'L AFF. 379 (1994) (citing UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 1 (1993));
UNHCR, media release, Oct. 4, 1993 (quoting Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees); United Nations Population Fund, The State of World Population (1993).
61. Theoretical and political consensus probably is possible in very limited areas, particularly
where facilitation and not the root causes of migration is at issue. For example, countries desiring to
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Thus, the developed world, and the United States in particular, is likely
to respond to millions of potential migrants by continuing to distinguish
between "us" and "them" at the time that entry decisions are made. Clearly,
the creation of a unified labor market in the European Union, the European
drive to enunciate a common refugee policy, and the move to deregulate
movement within the territory of the European Community (EC) all need to
be addressed. At least in Europe, "us" and "them" are relative terms, and
frontiers aren't what they used to be. Nevertheless, as a general principle,
individual states will continue to police their own borders and maintain their
own immigration policies. They will continue to welcome their own
nationals (or "citizens"), temporary visitors from other countries who
demonstrate that they are not likely to compete for jobs or overstay their
welcome, and a limited number of aliens seeking long-term or permanent
residence. Some of the latter will be relatives of those already residing
legally within the State's borders. Most, however, will be especially
"desirable" economic migrants or refugees. Everyone else (including the
vast majority of the world's migratory population) will be unwelcome, and
will be treated as "illegal aliens" should they attempt to enter or succeed in
entering without permission.
Even in Europe, much of the responsibility for border control will rest
with national immigration authorities.
However, almost
everywhere-including the United States and all of the other traditional
immigrant-receiving countries-the approach toward those seeking refuge
will continue to have a significant international dimension.
Intergovernmental cooperation is likely to borrow heavily from practices
adopted during the Cold War, but those practices are likely to be recast to
discourage the resettlement of refugees and to limit the right of asylum.
Assuming that the number of people involuntarily displaced from their
native countries continues to grow at anything approaching current rates, it
seems certain that virtually all cooperation will be directed at providing
restrict immigration may believe that some additional control will result if airlines and other carriers are
required to screen their passengers better, and are forced to bear the cost of returning undocumented or
inadequately documented aliens to their places of origin. This has been the practice in the United States
for many years, and has recently become common practice in Europe. See Charles B. Keely and Sharon
Staunton Russell, Responses of IndustrialCountries to Asylum-Seekers, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 399, 403 (1994).
Assuming that such laws are enforced, there is good reason to believe that this practice will deter
at least some entrants, since the airlines will turn more people away. However, the net effect of the
policy on migration numbers is likely to be fairly small since many aliens have the alternative of entering
illegally across land borders or being smuggled in.
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emergency aid and the better policing of national borders. Although subject
to some important qualifications within the territory of the European Union,
the principle of national sovereign control over immigration is likely to be
strengthened rather than diminished.
A much better prospect of greater "globalization"-or, at least, of strong
regionalization and the partial surrender of sovereignty to a supranational
entity--exists in the realm of labor migration. Progress in forging a
European Union, although far from complete, suggests that the more highlydeveloped countries in Europe have committed themselves to a fullyintegrated labor market-although not a labor market generally "open" to
entrants from outside the EU. However, as the absence of provisions for

labor market integration in NAFTA illustrates, even this qualified
commitment has not been matched in the United States. The continuing
existence of an economic and social "fault line" at the global level,
separating the "developed North" from the "undeveloped" or "developing
South," suggests that it is not likely to be matched in the foreseeable future.
B. The Waxing and Waning of the "InternationalRefugee Regime"
It has been apparent since the end of World War I that refugees pose
problems far from the place of original misfortune and long after they have
experienced displacement or persecution. The defeat of the Axis powers led
to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, bloody
nationalistic struggles in eastern and central Europe and the area then called
the "Near East," and the disorderly migration of millions of Greeks, Turks,
Kurds, Bulgarians, and Armenians. The humiliation of the Russian army in
1918 led directly to revolution, nearly a decade of civil war, and the flight
of hundreds of thousands of "White Russians" to places as remote as France,
the United States, and China. More than twenty years after the war ended,
on the eve of another global conflagration, more than 15,000 of these
refugees, still stranded in Shanghai, continued to seek permanent
resettlement in any country willing to take them.
In the early 1920s, the international community began to address the
global refugee problem systematically. The first coordinated steps were
tiny, resulting in a small office, loosely connected to the League of Nations,
that lobbied on behalf of refugees. Its chief accomplishment was the
creation of a standardized document, the so-called "Nansen passport," which
a number of nations agreed to accept in lieu of regular identity papers and
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which, on the sufferance of the host countries, served as a temporary ticket
of admission. Resurgence of refugee problems in the 1930s, a result of
continuing turmoil in the U.S.S.R. and persecution of Jews in Germany and
Austria, led to the following: the reconstitution of the refugee office,
directed by a "High Commissioner for Refugees under the protection of the
League of Nations";62 the promulgation of two multilateral conventions,
intended to accord specified minimal social and political rights to refugees
in their countries of asylum, but which received virtually no international
support and were accorded very little protection;6 3 and intergovernmental
attempts to find places of permanent resettlement for European Jews, which
failed miserably.'
By 1939, it thus was clear that refugees were common, mobile, and very
difficult to resettle. It was also clear that their arrival in foreign countries
posed significant practical problems and could be politically destabilizing.
The early refugee conventions were promulgated during the Great
Depression; although they afforded no guarantee that refugees would receive
permanent protection, they met with considerable local resistance. The late
1930s, in fact, were marked by numerous incidents of refugees being turned
away at a series of national borders or being expelled by several States. The
common interest in "doing something" about refugees, which was felt most
acutely in western Europe, was overmatched by the selfish interests of
governments and their constituencies.6 5 Only in a few instances did the

62.

Louise W. Holborn, The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem, in 203 ANNALS AM.
124, 134 (1939).
63. According to Holborn, the first Convention, presented on October 26, 1933, was intended
to apply to all holders of "Nansen passports" and "improved the Nansen certificate system in regard to
the period of validity as well as the right to return to the hospitable country, restricted the practice of
expulsion, insured the enjoyment of civil rights, and secured most favorable treatment in respect to labor,
welfare, relief, and taxation." Id. at 132. However, it was only "ratified by eight States with various
reservations which in certain cases appreciably restrict its value, especially in regard to the refugee's right
to work." Id. at 132 n.15.
The second Convention of February 10, 1938 applied to Germans who had not originally been
eligible to receive Nansen passports. "This convention gave the German refugees certain privileges of
sojourn and residence in signatory states; provided for a travel and identity document; gave a certain
amount of protection against forcible return to Germany; and in general repeated the provisions of the
1933 convention with respect to legal status, labor conditions, and social welfare." Id. at 133.
Holborn, perhaps because of the time her article appeared, failed to note that France, Belgium, and
Germany were the only States that ratified the second convention. The terms of both conventions were
routinely violated after the advent of World War I.
64. See, e.g., DAVID WYMAN, PAPER WALLS: AMERICA AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS, 1938-1941
(1968) (a classic account of the U.S. role in the failed Evian conference).
65. Adverse economic conditions were probably the greatest motivators of narrow self-interest,
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
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convergence of national interests lead to solutions that permanently removed
unfortunate people from harm's way. Although some have characterized the
interwar approach to refugees as an "international regime," that
characterization seems far too generous. At best, it was a proto-regime, an
imperfect and unsuccessful model of how States might coordinate their
responses to a difficult global situation.
After World War II, however, a genuine "international refugee regime"
emerged, characterized by the following: (1) the common or convergent
interests of powerful States; (2) a set of overlapping
ideologies--"mythologies" might be the more accurate term-which served
to convince receiving or benefactor States that they were likely to "do well
by doing good" (confidence in the ability of "liberal" ideas and practices to
reform the world were consistently linked with anti-Communism); (3) a
broadly accepted legal framework that most non-communist States were
willing to use, at least generally, to conform their actions to international
standards; (4) permanent or temporary resettlement opportunities provided
by a variety of countries that were nearly adequate to accommodate the
world's refugee population; (5) marginally adequate funding to deal with
"refugee emergencies"; (6) a permanent refugee office within the United
Nations with enough funding, administrative competence, and international
prestige to provide limited on-site aid and perform important coordinating
functions in the provision of legal protection, the solicitation of funding for
"refugee emergencies," the administration of long-term on-site aid and thirdcountry resettlement, and (more recently) the repatriation of people deemed
no longer in danger to their countries of origin;' (7) a corps of diplomats
although widespread anti-Semitism also played a role. Commenting on the world's refusal to settle more
than 250,000 European Jews in the 1933-39 period, Walter Adams noted that the crisis arose "at a time
of economic crisis that has almost stopped normal migration." Walter Adams, Extent and Nature ofthe
World Refugee Problem, 203 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCi. 26, 32 (1939). Even France, which
pursued a much more generous refugee admissions policy than any other western nation, was affected.
[F]rom 1924 to 1926 France recruited labor from among the Russian refugees in Eastern
Europe and Germany.
Economic distress and political tension in 1935 led to severe restrictions in the
employment of aliens and even to some expulsion of refugees; and a period of acute difficulty
for the refugees followed ....

Walter Adams, Refugees inEurope, 203 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. Soc. SCI. 38, 41-42 (1939).
66. From an institutional perspective, the "international refugee regime" probably includes a
variety of actors and not just the UNHCR. Gil Loescher makes the following point:
Since 1950, an international refugee regime composed of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and a network of other international agencies, national governments and
voluntary or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have developed response strategies that

1994]

A VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES

competent to discuss refugee affairs with their counterparts from other
countries; and (8) an emerging tradition of dealing with virtually every
aspect of the global refugee problem through ongoing or ad hoc bilateral or
multilateral negotiation.
It is important to note that this regime did not emerge full-grown from
the head of Zeus. Gil Loescher, in his excellent outline of the International
Refugee Regime's institutional dimensions and development,67 has
demonstrated that it progressed in stages and has been heavily dependent on
the active support of the United States and other developed nations. The
UNHCR, for example, lacked the funding and prestige to play a major role
in refugee relief or resettlement until the United States lent its political and
financial support after the 1956 Hungarian uprising.68 Its expansion into
the Third World "during the 20-year period from the late 1950s to the late
1970s" depended heavily on the acquiescence and assistance of former
colonizing powers.69 In every instance, States have sought to coordinate
and regularize their responses to refugees out of a strong sense of national
self-interest. Thus, as Gil Loescher and I argued in Calculated Kindness,
U.S. willingness to resettle large numbers of Hungarians, Cubans, Soviet
Jews, and Indochinese, and to favor asylum applicants fleeing from
communist countries, was driven more by geopolitical and ideological
70
concerns than it was by simple humanitarianism.
Using refugee policy to promote foreign policy objectives (and perhaps
help "save the world for democracy" in the process) makes perfectly good
sense if the cost of resettlement is relatively low and the dangers posed by
doing nothing are-orat least seem-inordinately high. Because the costs
today are so high, and the most tangible benefit associated with the regime
during its glory days-the forestalling of communist expansion-is no
longer relevant, the development of the regime has been reversed, and it
appears to have entered a period of prolonged (and perhaps irreversible)
decline.
permit some refugees to remain in their countries of first asylum, enable others to be resettled
in third countries and arrange for still others to be repatriated to their countries of origin.
Loescher, supra note 56, at 352 n.3. See also LOESCHER, supra note 30 (providing a fuller account of
the history, organization, objectives, and accomplishments of the international refugee bureaucracy, and
of its complicated relationship with individual governments).
67. Loescher, supra note 56.
68. Id. at 358-59.
69. Id. at 359-60.
70. See generally LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 21.
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It is tempting to hope that regimes can function independently of their
creator-member-patrons; that international organizations such as the UNHCR
are capable of taking on a political life of their own; that ideologies of
generosity and welcome are self-sustaining; and that international law is a
source of international standards sufficiently autonomous and well-regarded
that it can stand in the way of local political initiatives. To a limited
degree, such hope is probably justified. More than a hundred countries are
either signatories to, or have agreed to abide by, the general principles of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol
to that Convention.7 ' They have committed themselves, among other
things, to a persecution-based definition of refugee that supposedly makes
no ideological distinctions among victims or persecutors and to the principle
of non-refoulement, that is, to the principle that refugees are entitled not to
be returned to places of likely persecution. Such commitments impose at
least some constraints on independent action. The international response to
refugee emergencies outside of Europe in recent decades, and the
willingness of the UNHCR to extend its "good offices" to people who may
not meet the refugee definition set forth in the 1967 Protocol, have helped
condition the world to believe that poor, uneducated, and frequently
politically unsophisticated people from underdeveloped countries have as
much to fear and are as deserving of protection as the "political refugees"
fleeing communism who were the principal beneficiaries of the 1951
Convention. The expansion of the UNHCR's budget, relief, and legal
protection functions has given the organization a much bigger voice in
policymaking than it had twenty years ago.
Nevertheless, there are ample signs that the "community of interest" that
helped create the present regime has eroded significantly in recent years and
has been reduced to two fundamental points of agreement: first, a shared
sense that egregious and well-publicized refugee emergencies, such as the
outpouring from Rwanda, ought to receive some sort of immediate response
to alleviate suffering and minimize destabilization in the country of firstasylum; second, a shared belief that the industrialized western nations need
to find the most effective means to fend off asylum-seekers and secure the
quickest return of refugees to their country of origin.

71. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJuly 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
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Part of the problem is simply numerical: there are already far too many
victims who already have been pushed out of their countries or are on the
verge of departure. According to Aristide Zolberg:
Over the last 20 years, the number of refugees worldwide has
increased dramatically-from approximately 5 million, a number
with which receiving nations could cope, to nearly 20 million....
The total number of displaced persons in the world today is
approaching 50 million people, and violence, environmental
degradation, rogue regimes and anarchy add to this figure.72
The numbers are particularly disconcerting because so many of the world's
refugees and victimized people now have the means of reaching the
industrialized West. Dennis Gillagher spoke for many when he recently
noted:
In the post-Cold War period, many states have collapsed or are
unstable; war and human rights abuses are common. Some of these
states are nearer to Western states than was previously the case.
There is growing awareness of how small the world has become and
how easily people can learn of and avail themselves of
policies-such as those governing political asylum-that permit
them to start life anew in a country that is democratic, respects
human rights and provides basic economic opportunities.7 3
With numbers come economic and social costs. Refugees, by definition,
are migrating out of desperation; it is hardly surprising that many lack
money, education, and vocational and language skills. According to Charles
Keely and Sharon Russell, "[a]sylum is expensive. Care for asylum
applicants in industrial countries and adjudication of their claims are
estimated to cost from $8 billion to $10 billion annually."74 Particularly
in times of recession or economic stagnation, any resources directed toward
migrants, however great their needs, can spur resentment and ignite
underlying racial and ethnic animosity. This reaction has clearly been the
case in Germany and other parts of Europe:

72.
73.
74.
Welcome to

Burkhead, supra note 6, at 584.
Gallagher, supra note 25, at 443.
Keely & Russell, supra note 61, at 402 (citing John Darnton, Western Europe is Ending its
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at A10).

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:79

As the numbers continued to increase, asylum, illegal immigration,
the remnants of guest worker programs and the fear of even greater
asylum demands following the breakup of the Soviet Union all
made migration a politically sensitive issue in Europe. Antiimmigrant political parties gained strength. Anti-foreigner incidents
increased and provoked controversy. Questions were raised about
Europe's capacity to absorb refugees and the wisdom of even trying
to incorporate culturally very different people into ethnically based
societies. Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that Germany was not
a country of immigration. French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua
told Parliament: "France was once a country of immigration, but it
no longer wants
to be one . . . . [T]he goal we have set is zero
immigration.""7
Overt manifestations of racial or ethnic hatred directed specifically at
refugees have been comparatively rare in the United States-although it is
difficult to explain our Haitian policy without saying that successive
administrations have deemed it politically inexpedient to extend any sort of
welcome to the black residents of that beleaguered island. Yet the goal of
"zero immigration" appears to have a substantial following in California,
and may also be spreading to other parts of the country.
These considerations do not mean that the United States will abandon
the existing regime entirely. Receiving countries will almost certainly
continue to cooperate in ways that have been common since World War II:
for example, by jointly underwriting emergency relief operations and the
ongoing work of the UNHCR; meeting regularly to address crisis situations
and the ever-worsening problem of asylum claims;76 and even occasionally
reaching agreement to grant temporary "safe haven" to particular victims of
human rights abuse (such as Haitian "boat people"). Yet as the difficulty
in finding even temporary refuge for the Haitians illustrates, there is nothing
on the horizon that suggests the existing "international refugee regime" will
act to expand the opportunity for refugees to resettle or find asylum outside
their countries of origin. Nor does it appear, except in Europe (and there
under very restrictive conditions), that multinational organizations will

75. Id. at 401 (quoting William Drozdiak, Rolling Up a Worn-Out Welcome Mat, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1993, at AI0).
76. According to Keely and Russell, "over 100 meetings among developed countries of Europe
and North America addressed [the] issue [of political asylum] in 30 forums in 1991 alone." Keely &
Russell, supra note 61, at 407.
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displace sovereign States either in setting refugee policy or in implementing
it.
C. CoordinatedResponses
Coordinated responses began in Europe as a necessary corollary of the
movement to abolish internal borders within the EC.77 The prospect of
free movement from nation to nation after entry had been achieved invited
common policies to regulate admission. Of particular concern was the
tendency of asylum-seekers to move from nation to nation, filing multiple
applications in the hope that one would offer refuge. To discourage such
"shopping" for asylum, and also to reduce the processing load of the EC
States and the possibility that rejected applicants might be passed back and
forth endlessly among these States,78 all Members have signed one or both
of "[tiwo parallel agreements, the Dublin Convention and the Second
Schengen Agreement.... Both agreements, with slight variations, contain
rules for determining a 'responsible state' which agrees to process an
applicant for asylum from a country outside the European Communities."79
The idea that a single State can be assigned exclusive responsibility to
make an asylum determination does not mean that the "responsible State"
must in fact grant asylum. Instead, it may process a claim, reject it, and
return the applicant to his or her country of origin, absolving itself and its
co-signatories of any further legal responsibilities with respect to that
particular alien. Alternatively, under its own asylum-processing rules, it can

77. See Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 30 I.L.M. 84 (1991)
[hereinafter Second Schengen Agreement].
According to Gerald Neuman, "[t]his integrated territory, which does not yet exist, has been
nicknamed 'Schengenland.' Schengenland is growing beyond the original five members to include Italy,
Portugal, Spain, and even Greece. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom so far have resisted
joining the agreement." Gerald Neuman, "BufferZones against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the
German Asylum Amendment, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 503, 507 (1993).
78. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 77, at 507 n.23 (quoting Convention Determining the State
Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the
European Communities, 30 I.L.M. 427, 428 (1991) [hereinafter Dublin Convention]) (noting that one of
the purposes stated in the preamble of the so-called Dublin Convention is "to ensure that applicants for
asylum are not referred successively from one Member State to another without any of these States
acknowledging itself to be competent to examine the application for asylum.").
79. Neuman, supra note 77, at 506. See Second Schengen Agreement, supra note 77; Dublin
Convention, supra note 78.
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refuse to process the claim and return the applicant to the applicant's nonEC country of "first asylum" for refugee processing there.
Although this last alternative is not explicitly provided for in the 1951
Convention, nor in the 1967 Protocol, returning an applicant to a country of
"first asylum" that is not likely to persecute the applicant does not appear
to conflict with the fundamental refugee instruments. Germany has taken
advantage of this fact by designating Poland as a "safe country" and
arranging the return of all asylum-seekers who have passed through Polish
territory on the way to Germany.80 However, the expeditious removal of
unwanted asylum-seekers, rather than the protection of victims, is the clear
purpose of the policy.
Countries in North America have also begun coordinated claim
processing.
Canada, "consciously borrow[ing] from the European
treaties,"'" "has recently amended its immigration laws to make possible
the rejection of asylum applicants who have passed through the United
States." 2 The United States and Canada have engaged in negotiations "to
establish a reciprocal agreement for the return of asylum applicants who
have passed through either of these countries on the way to the other."83
According to Neuman, "the United States has [also] been engaged in a
program of cooperation, whose details are not publicized, under which the
Mexican government apprehends and deports Central Americans attempting
to transit through Mexico to the United States."'
D. Erosion of Legal Protection
One of the features of the post-international refugee regime (the period
from 1950 to the present) has been its willingness to expand the legal and

80. See Neuman, supra note 77, at 508, 520-21. Although agreements with Poland and the
Czech Republic were still pending when the Neuman article was published, the agreement with Poland
is now in effect. Keely & Russell, supra note 61, at 404 (citing Michael W. Divine, Note, German
Asylum Law Reform and the European Community: Crisis in Europe, 7 GEo. IMM. L.J. 795, 804-09
(1993)).
81. Neuman, supra note 77, at 504.
82. Id. at 504. See also LOESCHER, supra note 30, at 110.
83. Neuman, supra note 77, at 504 (citing Canadian Government ProposesMajor Revisions to
Its Immigration Law, 69 INTERPRErER RELEASES 1396, 1398 (1992); Canada Tightening Refugee Law,
REFUGEE REP., Sept. 30, 1992, at 1, 6-8).
84. Neuman, supra note 77, at 504 (citing Bill Frelick, Running the Gauntlet: The Central
American Journey in Mexico, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 208 (1991) and Congress Clears Funding Billfor
INS, State Department, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1263, 1265 (1992)).
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de facto definitions of "refugee." Victims seeking help during this period
initially owed their condition to events in Europe prior to 1951. After this
temporal refugee condition had been removed, some States-including the
United States-extended protection only to those fleeing Communist
regimes. The 1967 Protocol universalized the definition of "refugee" to
include all persons with a "well-founded fear of persecution" on account of
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion. Although the United States
ratified the 1967 Protocol in 1968, it did not incorporate this broader
definition into domestic law until 1980. In contrast, the UNHCR had long
before extended its "good offices" to desperate migrants without inquiring
too carefully into the origins of their fears. Additionally, individual
countries pursuing their own ideological and political ends resettled several
million people without making any individual determinations that they met
any refugee definition. As a consequence, the universe of refugees grew
immensely.
Today, "every Western government is having difficulty reconciling the
rights of refugees to a fair determination of their claims to asylum with its
85
own need to maintain an effective immigrant control mechanism. 1
Asylum and refugee resettlement programs in much of Europe and in
Canada have become much more restrictive over the last fifteen years. The
erosion of legal protection has sometimes involved the substantive right to
asylum, but more frequently it has involved the procedures under which
asylum or refugee status is sought and adjudicated. To the extent that the
substantive and procedural rights of would-be refugees and asylum-seekers
are distinguishable under U.S. law, it appears that both are under significant
attack in this country as well.
No traditional receiving State has formally repudiated its obligations
under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol to observe the principle of
non-refoulement, yet, many have made it much more difficult to present
asylum claims or prove refugee status. In addition to the cooperative
agreements just described, "refugee reform" has ranged from measures
intended to simplify identification and record-keeping to efforts intended to
deny presumptive refugee status to large groups of people. In Europe,
nations now generally impose fines on carriers for transporting people with
false or inadequate documents, a practice that has long been part of U.S.

85.

LOESCHER, supra note

30, at 127.
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law. These nations have also selectively legalized fingerprinting to prevent
multiple filings by particular applicants and have created expedited
administrative procedures to speed the processing of applicants who appear
not to qualify for protection at the time of their initial interview. Finally,
some have changed their underlying law to permit the government to reject
some claims without providing a hearing at all.86
Canada, again following the European lead, has simplified its asylum
procedures to speed refugee processing and the removal of the
unqualified.87 The United States is currently seeking to expedite refugee
processing through legislation and the adoption of new administrative
procedures. 8 However, it already has limited refugee rights significantly
by refusing to grant asylum hearings to Haitian "boat people" and by
obtaining favorable judgments from the U.S. Supreme Court that
substantially limit the scope of protection afforded by the governing refugee
instruments. Indeed, in the United States, the Supreme Court has probably

86, See Keely & Russell, supra note 61, at 403-04 (noting all of these measures including the
revision of Germany's Basic Law to permit expedited or cooperative asylum processing); see also
Neuman, supra note 77, at 509-21 (for a more thorough discussion of the German changes).
87. See LOESCHER, supra note 30, at 110.
88. According to Keely & Russell, supra note 61, at 403-04, "the United States introduced the
Immigration Enforcement and Asylum Reform Act in July 1993 .
to screen out clearly unqualified
applicants," but the legislation died in Congress.
Proposed regulations are currently pending that would substantially change INS asylum proceedings.
See Summary, Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum or Withholding of
Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779 (1994).
This rule would amend existing regulations to streamline the adjudication of asylum
applications submitted to Asylum Officers within the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). The rule would allow the INS to grant asylum to deserving applicants more promptly
and to resolve expeditiously the great number of meritless and abusive applications being filed
each year. Under the rule, Asylum Officers would no longer prepare detailed denials in cases
where they do not grant asylum to applicants who have no legal immigration status, but
instead would automatically issue mandatory referrals of these applications to Immigration
Judges for completion of the adjudication as part of exclusion or deportation proceedings.
In addition, the rule makes interviews discretionary, authorizing the Asylum Officers to refer
claims immediately to Immigration Judges. The rule also would restrict employment
authorization to applicants for asylum or withholding of deportation whose claims have been
pending for more than 150 days, a period which would not run until the alien has filed a
complete application and would not include delays sought or caused by the applicant. This
rule also would conform existing regulations to the current practice of receiving applications
for asylum and withholding of deportation at the four INS Service Centers. To provide
necessary funding for the asylum adjudications process, the rule would provide for imposition
of a filing fee for asylum applications and for employment authorization applications based
on a pending asylum application.
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been as influential as the "political branches" of government in narrowing
the rights accorded refugees.
In INS v. Stevic, 89 the Court held that mandatory "witholding of
deportation" under INA § 243(h) (a statutory provision that tracks Article
33, the non-refoulement provision of the 1951 Refugee Convention, almost
word-for-word) applies "only if the alien's life or freedom 'would' be
threatened in the country to which he would be deported; it does not require
withholding if the alien 'might' or 'could' be subject to persecution."90
Although the force of this "more likely than not" standard was mitigated in
a later case assessing an applicant's burden of proof when he or she has
sought discretionary "asylum" under INA § 208,91 its effect was still to
impose a surprisingly heavy burden on applicants denied discretionary relief.
In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,92 the Court adopted a similarly surprising and
narrow view of what persecution "on account of' political opinion consists
of. As a result, the motives of an applicant confronting an abusive and
threatening authority have become more important than the human rights
abuser's own acts or motives. Finally, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc.,93 decided in 1993, the Court accepted the government's argument that
"its international obligation not to return refugees to countries of persecution
does not apply outside the borders of the United States. 94 This decision
permitted the Clinton administration to deny Haitians picked up on the high
seas by U.S. officials the right to apply for asylum.
E. Diminution of FinancialSupport
The United States has contributed a great deal of money to refugee
resettlement over the past fifty years. It and the other industrialized nations
will probably continue to do so when confronted with refugee emergencies
of the magnitude of the Rwandan outpouring. Indeed, the budget of the
UNHCR has more than doubled since 1990. 95 Industrialized nations
89. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1983).
90. Id. at 422.
91. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443-50 (1986) (interpreting "well-founded fear
of persecution" to include a subjective element and not to require a showing that persecution is "more
likely than not.").
92. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. 812, 816 (1992).
93. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993).
94. Neuman, supra note 77, at 503 (citing Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2562-63).
95. The Evolution of the UNHCR, supra note 26, at 421-22 (noting that the budget jumped from
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probably have good cause to consider their money well-spent, to the extent
that the UNHCR continues to focus on repatriation and on-site emergency
aid and avoids pressing its principal contributors too hard to afford more
legal protection for asylum-seekers or to open up more resettlement slots.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the dramatic increase in the number of
people seeking refuge has had a negative financial effect. Sadako Ogata
acknowledges that "compassion fatigue" exists; she hopes that the "great
strain on governments to meet our needs ... will be phased out," although
she presents no timetable when she believes that will occur.96 Meanwhile,
the UNHCR and all the other agencies involved in refugee relief,
repatriation, and resettlement have to contend with what Gil Loescher has
identified as "the inadequacy of the existing resource base."97 According
to Loescher, not only are new situations mushrooming up all around the
world, but "humanitarian missions today are likely to be protracted affairs
with no clear outcome." As a consequence, "UNHCR is now in danger not
only of overextending itself because of its involvement in vicious and
intractible conflicts, but also of exhausting the political interest of donor
governments in continuing to fund such protracted operations. 'g
F. The Intergovernmental Option
The final limit on the international refugee regime is implicit in the
discussion of the ways that governments have cooperated in allocating
"responsibility" for asylum applications and in paying for refugee relief. In
both cases, governments have agreed among themselves about the best way
to act, but have generally refused to surrender decision-making power to the
UNHCR, the Council of Europe, or any other international or supranational
organization.
Cooperation in the interests of particular States has thus become
customary-but only to the extent that the States continue to give their
active and ongoing consent. Keely and Russell have made the point well:

$500 million in 1990 to $1.1 billion in 1992, and that the agency remained "fully funded").
96. Id. at 421-22. Elsewhere in the interview, she answers the question, "Do you expect fewer
emergencies in the future?" with this far-from-encouraging response: "I would like to hope so, but the
world is in a period of deep trouble, and it's also going from a bipolar Cold War era to whatever it will
have next. All I'm saying is that there has to be some order-some order has to emerge." Id. at 422.
97. Loescher, supra note 56, at 367.
98. Id.
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In response to rising applications for asylum... industrial countries
have sought to coordinate their . . .policies. "Harmonization"
became the buzzword for attempts to agree upon and implement
policies undertaken jointly or collectively or, if pursued unilaterally,
that nevertheless are compatible and similar in goals, content, and
style. As previously noted, over 100 meetings among developed
countries in Europe and North America addressed this issue in 30
forums in 1991 alone. These diplomatic forums have been
distinctively intergovernmental. Each government reserved for itself
the competence to deal with the issue. 99
I believe that the phenomenon they describe is widespread and likely to
continue. Thus, I accept their view that "[t]he close relation of protecting
borders to the traditional concept of an international community based on
nation-states makes the transfer of entry, control to a multilateral agency
controversial. States are reluctant to cede asylum decisions to the United
Nations or any other multilateral body."'' °
G. NAFTA--and the Muted Messagefrom Maastricht
Despite their reluctance to surrender the sovereign power to make
ultimate decisions about who crosses their borders-decisions that "cut close
to the core of nation-states' vital functions"'' and even closer to their core
of political identity 2-it is clear that some governments have in fact
surrendered a portion of that power in the name of the "single market."
Ongoing economic unification in Europe has had political and institutional
consequences, including the adoption by EU Member States of a common
labor migration policy and an aggressive process of "harmonization" that has
led to the virtual abolition of constraints on the ordinary movement and jobhunting of EU "citizens.' 0 3 Although the Member States retain the right
99. Keely & Russell, supra note 61, at 407.
100. Id. at 408.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (the Chinese Exclusion
Case).
That the government of the United States .. .can exclude aliens from its territories is a
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory
to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is part of its independence. If
it could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power.
Id. at 603-04.
103. The issue of EC "citizenship" is addressed below. See infra note I 1. For a discussion of
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to withdraw from the union, as members they are bound to follow the lead
of the EC's supranational legislative and judicial bodies. Thus, they have
not only committed themselves to a unified market in capital, goods, and
labor, but have also committed themselves, in a constitutional sense, to a
permanent immigration policy that has been collectively determined and is,
at least within the borders of the EC, surprisingly "open."
Do these developments in Europe have any significance for the United
States? Have the signatories of NAFTA embarked on a similar course?
Will the promise of a single North American market lead in the direction of
greater continental unity, the erosion of national domination of immigration
policy and practice, or the promulgation of new collective institutions? Can
we, in other words, derive any positive, locally applicable lessons about the
globalization--or at least the strong regionalization--of a major segment of
immigration policy by examining the process of European unification from
its post-World War II roots to the ratification of the Maastricht treaty?
There are no simple answers to these questions. Clearly, Maastricht
gives some reason to hope for a more genuinely collaborative and less
restrictive North American policy. A closer look at the European and North
American situations, at the differences between them, and at the limits of the
measures taken to date on each continent, however, suggests that even where
labor migration is concerned, truly "open" borders are difficult to achieve

recent policy, see R. OWEN & M. DYENES, Tu'rLE GUIDE TO THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 86 (1992)
("One of the main benefits of 1992 is the promise it holds out (for] free movement .. "). The authors
further add:
As a result of legislation governing professional and worker mobility, EC nationals are
entitled to take up employment or set up a business anywhere in the Community. Much of
the impenetrable bureaucracy that used to confront people attempting to work abroad has been
dismantled, thereby giving professionals, workers and even the unemployed unprecedented
opportunities to pursue employment prospects outside their country of origin. Although
Community nationals are still required to obtain residence permits, the need to obtain work
permits has been abolished. Nevertheless, much work remains before the Commission's goal
of creating a genuinely free market for labour is complete. Even before the advent of 1992,
some member states (notably France) have been erecting new barriers to labour mobility in
an effort to protect their own domestic labour markets.
Id. at. 118.
See also John Pinder, The Single Market: A Step Towards Union, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 51 (Juliet Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993). The author points out that "the
objective of ensuring free movement of EC citizens to take up jobs anywhere in the Community... has
in the past been impeded by differing requirements for professional qualifications; but the EC has by now
enacted legislation contributing largely to the removal of this restriction on the freedom of its citizens."
Id. at 53.
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anywhere and are not likely to emerge in the foreseeable future in this
hemisphere.
H. The Lure of Efficient Markets
A fair history of European unification needs to distinguish between
original intentions and later theoretical justifications. The progenitors of the
idea of a unified Europe believed in "efficient markets," but also pursued
pragmatic objectives that could not be met by a simple economic theory.
Their mixed agenda from the beginning embraced political as well as
economic goals. Their politics, influenced by the desire to end centuries of
Franco-German conflict and to halt the spread of Communism, favored local
cooperation over local competition, and accepted a considerable amount of
State intervention in the workings of the marketplace.
Coordinated
industrial policy in a limited but key area-the coal and steel
'' °4
industries-was at least as important to them as "free trade.

104. Acoording to Pascal Fontaine, the European unification initiative had its origins in concerns
about dealing with Germany after the onset of the Cold War: "The United States wanted to speed up
economic recovery of a country on the edge of the continental divide and voices in Washington were
already [in 1949] calling for German rearmament." PASCAL FONTAINE, EUROE-A FRESH START: THE
SCHUMAN DECLARATION, 1950-1990, at 9 (1990).
The initiative was launched on May 9, 1950, with the issuance of the Schuman Declaration, which
had already been approved by the French and German governments. It called for a joint French-German
initiative "to rebuild Europe .... This will open the door to other joint activities inconceivable hitherto.
Europe will emerge from all this; a Europe that is firmly united and solidly built; a Europe where living
standards will rise as a result of the pooling of production and the expansion of markets leading to lower
prices." Id. at 13.
Fontaine further notes:
The Declaration ... defines a set of principles: Europe will not be built all at once; it will
be built by concrete achievements which first create defacto solidarity:
(i) The age-old rivalry between France and Germany was to be eliminated: the venture would
be of immediate concern to France and Germany but would be open to all European nations
sharing the same objectives.
(ii) Immediate action would focus on a 'limited, but decisive target': Franco-German coal
and steel production, which would be placed under a common High Authority.
(iii) The merging of economic interests would help raise the standard of living and pave the
way for the establishing of an economic community.
(iv) The High Authority's decisions would be binding on the countries that joined. Its
members would be independent figures, jointly appointed. Its decisions would be enforceable.
Id.
On June 20, 1950, representatives of the governments of France, Germany, the three Benelux
countries, and Italy met to hammer out the framework for agreement. "The Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC] was signed on 18 April 1951 for a period of 50 years.
It was ratified by the six signatory States, and on 10 August 1952 the High Authority, with Jean Monnet
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Yet, for tactical reasons, those promoting a unified Europe quickly
began to emphasize one of the three "communities" that France, Germany,
Italy, and the Benelux countries had created, namely, the "European
Common Market." A federalist political program proved difficult to sell
within the original Member States and had little appeal to other potential
Members. As memories of World War II and the threat of Soviet military
expansion receded, "efficient market" arguments-which had always been
part of the justification for unification-assumed a greater importance. Postwar recovery was substantial but uneven. A bigger Europe without tariffs
and fewer barriers to the movement of goods, capital, and people, it was
argued, would be able to create bigger and more efficient firms, produce and
sell goods more cheaply, and be in a much better position to compete in the
world marketplace. The goal of creating a "common market" that could
promote these goals was specifically set forth in the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty),"°5 which0 6 treated labor as
a "factor of production" quite similar to venture capital.
By drafting the treaty this way, its authors-in common with many
scholars-assumed a link between "free trade" and the relatively free
movement of labor. Because they also assumed that many of the
industrialized countries were capable of sustained growth, yet were held
back by low birthrates and a small population of native-born labor market

as its President, opened for business in Luxembourg." Id. at 15.
In 1957, the six original Members established "the European Economic Community (EEC) and the
European Atomic Energy Community (also called Euratom) by the Treaties of Rome of 25 March 1957."
JEAN-VICTOR Louis, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 7 (2d ed. 1990). According to Louis:
[s]ince the entry into. force of the Rome Treaties on I January 1958, three distinct
Communities based on separate constitutions have existed. But the three Communities were
set up to achieve the same fundamental objectives: the creation of an 'organized Europe',
,an even closer union among the peoples of Europe' and a 'common effort' contributing
to 'the prosperity of their peoples'.
Id.
105. See EEC Treaty, as modified by the Single European Act, 1987 O.J. [L169], art. 8A, at 1,7
(setting forth the goal of establishing "the internal market ... [that] shall comprise an area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty"); see also id. at art. 2 (indicating that freedom of
movement is intended to promote "a harmonious development of economic activities").
Kevin Johnson, who glosses these provisions, notes that "It]he EEC Treaty thus afforded freedom
of movement to European Union [sic] 'nationals as economic actors, not citizens per se."' Johnson,
supra note 18, at 971, 972 (quoting Daniel Kanstroom, The Shining City and the Fortress: Reflections
on the 'Euro-solution' to the German Immigration Dilemma, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 201, 204
(1993)).
106. See EEC Treaty, arts. 8A, 3C; Johnson, supra note 18, at 976.
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entrants, immigration was treated as an economic virtue."0 7 At the
national level, the concept of "open borders" was extended in practice not
only to job-seekers resident in the EC, but also to "guestworkers" from
outside the community who, it was believed, could be hired temporarily to
fill needs cheaply and then sent home when economic conditions warranted
0

it.1

8

Perhaps because it has proved so difficult to remove guestworkers,
contemporary EU policy focuses only on migration within the boundaries
of the community. Within these boundaries, however, the Members appear
to have moved beyond what W.R. B6hning has characterized as the "neoliberal international economic order,"' 0 9 first codified by the International
Labour Organisation after World War II: "It should be the general policy

107. See W.R. BOHNING, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION 92 (1984) ("A growing
economy requires mobility of capital and labour."). B6hning focuses generally on "guestworkers" rather
than on intra-EC migrants. He specifically avoids discussing the option of "settlement immigration,"
which he claims "is politically unacceptable in nation-states that are not countries of settlement." Id. at
70. Part of his argument depends on the demographic characteristics of guestworkers and the likelihood
that they will be the first persons fired during a recession. However, much of what he says theoretically
applies to both categories. His argument assumes that the general trend is toward more economic
growth. It also assumes the existence of "mature" labor markets, a "self-feeding" process of labor
migration that cannot easily be reversed, and the likelihood that as economic conditions in the country
of employment change, the rate of labor migration will also change and-in cases of economic
recession-even turn temporarily downward. Id. at 70. Under these conditions, Bbhning argues that
immigration does not cause unemployment, although it may very well worsen the competitive situation
for some sectors of the indigenous work force. Id. at 71. Instead, immigration generally raises wages
in the receiving country rather than lowers them, and generally benefits the economy of the receiving
country, although their numbers may contribute "to social unrest on the part of the indigenous population
and to political intervention by the decision-makers." Id. at 85, 86-104.
108. B6hning notes that:
[e]mployers hit by the initial labour shortages naturally seek redress from their governments.
[They claim that] [t]heir profitability and productivity situation is 'obviously' too precarious
to sustain pay raises sufficient to attract indigenous labour, which means that sooner or later
they will have to go out of business with consequential drastic setbacks to the regional and
national economy. Foreign workers, however, would surely be prepared to do the jobs at the
prevailing wage rates, and if and when the vagaries of the business cycle should hit the
industry in question, one would incur few social problems by dismissing them.
Id. at 70.
Bohning further suggests that "guestworkers" are not nearly so easy to remove once they have been
admitted, since the process of migration is
self-feeding ... and it cannot be reversed except by a fundamental political decision. [Once
the process has begun,] it is incomparably more difficult to make such a decision-because
of the increased internal and additional international constraints-than it would have been to
adopt a strongly reformist manpower policy when the first gaps in the labour market
appeared.
Id.
109. BOHNING, supra note 107, at 6.
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of Members to develop and utilize all possibilities of employment and for
this purpose to facilitate the international distribution of manpower and in
particular the movement of manpower from countries which have a surplus
"l Thus, EU rules
of manpower to those that have a deficiency ....
governing labor movement of EU "citizens" within the territory of the union
do not specifically relate to labor surpluses or deficiencies;"'. instead, it
is assumed that the labor market is essentially self-regulating, that workers
will go where the jobs are, and that their free circulation will enhance
production and economic growth throughout the union.
This vision of the world is also attractive to some of the supporters of
NAFTA. While most seem willing to assume that an agreement that focuses
only on the flow of goods, services, and capital can generate more efficient
markets, a few have noted that relatively free migration between Mexico and
the United States is a necessary part of the equation and, if permitted, would
be likely to promote enhanced economic growth. "2 Their argument is a

110. Id. at 6-7 (quoting International Labour Organisation, Migration for Employment
Recommendation (Rev.), 1949, para. 4(1)).
11I. The Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, for the first time established common
"citizenship" within the EC. Article 8 establishes "citizenship of the Union," and provides that "[e]very
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union." Article 8(a) provides
that: "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of
the Member States, subject to the limits and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures
adopted to give it effect." Id.
The right to travel-and to work within the territory of other Member states-had already been
established in the 1957 EEC Treaty, and had been strengthened in the "Single European Act" (proposed
in 1985, adopted and ratified in 1986, and entered into force on July 1,1987), which, among other
things, added a new Article 8(a) to the EEC Treaty (which has been redesignated as Article 7(a) by the
Maastricht Treaty) to "deal with the persistence of barriers of all kinds to the free movement of people,
goods and services, and capital within the Community." Louis, supra note 104, at 23.
However, by making free movement and residence in a territory without "internal frontiers" a quasiconstitutional fight, the Maastricht Treaty has gone well beyond treating "nationals as economic actors,
not citizens per se." Johnson, supra note 18, at 972 (quoting Daniel Kanstroom, The Shining City and
the Fortress: Reflections on the 'Euro-solution' to the German Immigration Dilemma, 16 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 201, 204 (1993)).
112. According to Ojeda Hinosa and McCleery, (who favor "managed interdependence" rather
than totally "free markets"):
[i]nter-country flows [of goods, capital, and labor] are inevitable and symptomatic of the
differences in wages and rental rates between the two countries, and attempts to stem them
in one area can provoke compensating changes in other areas that may be surprising and
perverse from the perspective of the social actors and policymakers.... [G]reater exchange
yields more economic benefit.... [T]here are significant gains to policy coordination that
promote increased U.S.-Mexican interaction, through capital flows from North to South, labor
flows from South to North, and increased trade flows in both directions.
Ojeda Hinosa & McCleery, supra note 34, at 140-41.
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powerful one. Johnson has presented it well:
Free market principles suggest that a restrictionist NAFTA allowing
member states to make every effort to curtail illegal immigration
into their respective territories may not represent sound economic
policy. As the European Union recognized, free movement of
persons, services, and capital as factors of production further [sic]
economic aims.' 3
I. Forging a "Union "-Europe as a Positive Model
Despite his faith in open labor markets, Johnson is skeptical about the
possibility of achieving one in North America:
It seems readily apparent that a majority of the U.S. citizenry is
more uncomfortable with open borders with Mexico than it is with
free trade with Mexico. A proposalfor open immigration borders,
for example, would not be taken seriously in the politicalprocess.
More open trade borders-as NAFTA's ultimate success
illustrates-would be. In other words, in today's political climate,
the freerflow of trade is in the realm of politicalpossibility in the
United States, while freer immigration is not.114
The evolution of the EU over a course of nearly five decades, however, may
provide a glimmer of hope.
That hope does not stem from the "original understanding" that bound
the European States together; there is simply no parallel in North America
to the labor shortage that developed in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s
and the early European commitment to free labor migration among EC
Member States. Instead, it derives from the observation of a political and
bureaucratic process that led, very gradually, to the "harmonization" of EC
Members' laws to eliminate 'barriers and the institutionalization and

113. Johnson, supra note 18, at 976.
114. Id. at 967 (emphasis added). For a similarly pessimistic view, see Trejo Reyes, supra note
33, at 267, stating:
Of course, as has been pointed out in the past, there may be a natural complementarity of
Mexican and U.S. labor markets. However, it becomes clearer each day that the political will
to develop the advantages that might accrue to both countries from closer cooperation in this
area is simply not present; each country, but especially the United States, is unwilling to
contemplate the implications of such cooperation.
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expansion of the "harmonizing" process. The central component of that
process has probably not been treaty-making, but rather the creation, slow
empowerment, and even slower legitimation of supranational administrative
bodies having all of the following characteristics:
(1) substantial, although not complete, administrative independence
from the governments of Member States;
(2) substantial, although not complete, political legitimacy because
some of the Members of the European Parliament and some of its
most important initiatives, including the key provisions of the
Maastricht Treaty, have been approved by plebiscite or the
legislatures of the Members;
4(3) significant legislative power in areas of "community concern,"
including virtually every matter affecting the "single market," but
not including the power to pre-empt the authority of individual
Members to enact their own substantive immigration laws;
(4) significant judicial power to direct Member States to abide by
their commitments and conform to EC policies in areas of
"community concern;" and
(5) a general commitment to more "integration" of the Member
States and the continuation of the process whereby "sovereignty"
over particular matters has been surrendered (as a matter of fact, if
not always of law) by Member States to the EC.
The centrality of alternative institutions has been a hallmark of the EC
since its inception.
The Schuman Declaration established a "High
Commission" in 1950 with the principle that its "decisions would be binding
on the countries that joined. Its Members would be independent figures,
jointly appointed. Its decisions would be enforceable. ' 15 The same year,
the six original signatory States agreed to add "a Council of Ministers
[representing the Member States], .... [a] Parliamentary Assembly, and a
Court of Justice ....
16 Executive, legislative, and judicial bodies were,
thus, empowered to deal with matters of "community concern" from the
beginning.
As those bodies have evolved," 7 they have gained
115. FONTAINE, supra note 104, at 13.
116. Id. at 15.
117. See Louis, supra note 104, at 7.
As from 1 July 1967 the executive organs of the three Communities, the Council and the
Commission, were merged in a single Council and Commission under the merger Treaty signed in
Brussels on 8 April 1965. The Assembly (European Parliament) and the Court of Justice had been
common to the three Communities from the beginning under a convention signed in Rome in 1957

1994]

A VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES

considerable power and, in the process, deprived Member States of the
effective ability to deal with particular matters unilaterally.
The European Court of Justice, in an opinion that may have been overly
expansive, stated the principle in legal terms:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty
has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of
the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the
Member States and which their courts are bound to apply.
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity
of representation on the international plane and, more particularly,
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer
of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals
and themselves."'
As the Maastricht process demonstrated, however, the EC has been
transformed from a unique alliance to a proto-federal State, albeit through
the usually grudging, but nevertheless real, political willingness of Member
States to put their faith in the market paradigm, follow the "Eurocrats,"
accept the authority of these new institutions, and bind themselves and their
nationals to "European" solutions to common problems.' 9
together with the EEC and Euratom Treaties. The three Communities are thus functionally the
same organization.
Id.
118. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.
119. Writing in 1980, Stanley Hoffman asserted:
[g]one are the days when the champions and the theorists of European integration either called
for or predicted the gradual transfer of powers from the nation-state to a new European entity,
either through voluntary abdication of sovereignty, or through the subtle interplay of
functional processes and economic interdependence.
Stanley Hoffman, Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 21 (Loukas Tsoukalis ed., 1983). He was particularly
skeptical about the ability of market theory and pragmatic institution-building to motivate deep political
change:
After the remarkable explosion of theories about integration in the 1950s and early 60s, we
find a sudden drought.
The grand theory which has been, implicitly, Jean Monnet's and, explicitly, Ernst Haas',
has performed much better as an initial goad than as a permanent explanation. Derived from
the theories of industrial society, it suffered from the same weaknesses. It relied on
technology as the fuel, and on the logic of the market as the motor of integration: the drive
for economic modernization would lead to political unity. It was the old Saint-Simonian
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This transformation has resulted in substantial progress in eliminating
the so-called "internal frontiers" (i.e., checkpoints and other border controls
regulating movement from one Member State to another). It has brought the
EC to the threshold of eliminating other "us"-"them" distinctions among the
nationals of the various States through the institution of EU "citizenship."
It has extended collaboration into non-economic realms and laid the
groundwork for continuing social and political integration of a vast and
diverse territory.
For those desiring a more unified and cooperative approach to labor
migration in this hemisphere, Maastricht and all of the politics, treatymaking, and institution-building that preceded it thus convey some hope.
They demonstrate that a significant integration of States sharing common
interests is possible. Reciprocal commitments by these States can lead to
an expansively-defined "single" or "common" market and to "open" labor
migration within the territory of that market for the nationals of each State.
Such a market need not involve States that are in all respects similar or
economically alike. The EC has expanded in stages from its original sixMember core, first bringing in England, Denmark, and Ireland, and later,
Greece, Portugal and Spain. With the exception of Ireland, the first nine
Member States (the so-called EC-9) are quite heavily industrialized and
relatively rich; the more recent additions (the so-called EC-3) are poorer and
generally less heavily industrialized. Yet the European experience
demonstrates that a single labor market is a political possibility even under
these conditions, and even when some of the nations participating in that
market have populations that are generally less well-educated and have
lower wage expectations than their counterparts in the more highly
"developed" regions. Finally, the lack of progress in this hemisphere need
not be totally discouraging. The movement toward such a market can
progress over several decades, proceed in stages, and rely on consensus and
institution-building to prepare the political ground for more integration at a
future date.

dream of depoliticized progress, accompanied by one idea that, at first sight, seemed on the
contrary, quite political: the idea that the gradual dispossession of the nation-state and the
transfer of allegiance to the new Community would be hastened by the establishment of a
central quasi-federal political system (however it was conceived of as largely bureaucratic in
nature).
Id. at 29.
Recent events suggest that the "grand theory" has fared much better than Hoffman predicted.
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J. The Case for Pessimism
The most positive construction of the European experience emphasizes
accomplishments over the last half-century in integrating a dozen national
economies and creating a "single market" for labor. This approach
highlights the attractiveness of "efficient markets," the gradual evolution of
law and policy in the direction of eliminating barriers, and the role that new
political institutions (and their staffs) can play in facilitating-indeed, in
constituting--change. It plays down everything that appears to be unique
about the European experience, and ignores the limitations to truly "open
borders" that have characterized its response.
I believe that the
accomplishments have been real, but I also believe that the situation in
Europe after World War II was, in many respects, unique and that its
program of integration cannot be duplicated in North America. I also
believe that the measured pace of EC expansion and its current drive to
close Community borders to "outsiders," even as it moves to abolish
"internal frontiers," tell us something important about the fundamental limits
of "openness" in a world where the rich are surrounded by so many mobile
poor. For these reasons, I suspect that Europe's promise is more limited
than an optimist would credit, and that its process of transnational labor
market integration is not likely to be emulated soon on this side of the
Atlantic. 120
The origins of the Schuman Declaration have already been noted. The
conjunction of post-World War II reservations about nationalism, economic
distress during a period of post-war reconstruction, and apprehension about
the spread and influence of Communism cannot be recaptured. No one with
the vision and objectives of Jean Monnet has surfaced in United States. No
superpower exists to prod the United States into closer cooperation with its
neighbors. No political or legal tradition exists here to promote the
subordination of U.S. interests to any supranational entity, whereas the EC
at its inception created political institutions that permitted it to pursue a

120. One possible-perhaps even likely-exception to this conclusion involves labor migration
between Canada and the United States. The similarity between the economies of the two countries
suggests that free movement of labor across the U.S.-Canadian border would be far less politically
controversial than any arrangement that included Mexico-or any other Caribbean or Latin American
country. Were Qu6bec to declare independence, it seems likely that the remaining Atlantic provinces
would have a strong incentive to strengthen their political ties to the United States, and perhaps to seek
more comprehensive economic integration than NAFTA provides.
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quasi-independent policy and to promote a "progressive" idea of integration.
In comparison, NAFTA is a fairly conventional treaty, almost completely
lacking in bureaucratic superstructure.
Standing alone, these differences are not necessarily fatal. Arguably, the
logic of the marketplace will in time lead the NAFTA signatories to expand
the agreement and include labor within the umbrella of the "single market."
Business interests, always anxious to fully staff their firms and hire as
cheaply as possible, will substitute for an absent bureaucracy in promoting
greater integration. Global competition will provide a spur to change.
Three points need to be made about the integration of the European
labor market: first, it involves only a fraction of the countries in Europe,
and excludes the rest of the world; second, it has been accomplished only
after careful screening of potential Members; and third, it remains subject
to local, that is, national, political influence.
The first point leads us to a paradox or "contradiction": "free markets"
exclude even as they include. "Single" or "common markets," particularly
where labor is concerned, are bounded. They are not now, and perhaps
never have been, "open to all." Even when "internal frontiers" are
eliminated, external boundaries remain to distinguish "insiders" from
"outsiders." Although the former may trade their services freely, the latter
often are excluded from entering the market at all. Greeks-at least as a
matter of law-are now welcome to work in Germany, but Turks are not;
Algerians who have obtained French citizenship may work in Belgium, but
those who have not may not legally work anywhere within the EC.
The existence of boundaries and their dual function is philosophically
interesting. Whether boundaries are inevitable or not, it is certain that, in
the labor market context, they have been employed with regularity to
identify people from economically "advanced" countries as "insiders" and
people from "underdeveloped" or "developing" countries as "outsiders."
The significance of the "insider"-"outsider" distinction varies with the type
of market that intending migrants confront. If the labor market is a
"national" one, decisions about which outsiders to admit and under what
conditions remain with the nation-state. It may choose to welcome migrants
from any part of the world, grant those it admits immigration rights ranging
from protected "permanent residence" to "parole" (which, at least in the
United States, is revocable at will), and grant civil and political rights
ranging from full citizenship to disadvantaged "guestworker" status. If the
market is a "common" one, where "internal frontiers" still exist, the host
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State has less leeway. As a practical matter, the obligation to admit jobseekers from other Member States will probably limit the willingness to
admit third-country nationals. The experience of the EC in the 1960s and
1970s, however, demonstrates that, at least during periods of economic
boom, many of its Members were able to continue to "entertain" ("exploit"
might be the better word) "guestworkers" with the hope that they could
easily be repatriated. When that hope turned out to be ill-founded (as it
often did), these EC Members were stuck with suddenly unwelcome guests.
Nevertheless, if "internal frontiers" have been abolished and a true "single
market" has been established, its Members have a much stronger incentive
to adopt collective policies discouraging or even prohibiting the entry ofjobseeking third-country nationals, since admission by one is tantamount to
admission to all Members.
The logic of progressive integration is thus the logic of progressively
more stringent selection. The history of the EC supports this conclusion.
With the exception of Italy-whose future was a matter of considerable
concern to the United States and the rest of western Europe-each of the six
original Members was one of the most heavily industrialized countries in
Europe. In this century, at least, they had demonstrated no long-term
tendency to produce labor emigrants. Labor migrationfrom their respective
territories was unlikely to be massive; instead, it was likely to involve the
movement of a relatively small number of highly-skilled artisans and
professionals to neighboring countries where their skills were in demand.
Essentially, the same situation occurred when England, Ireland, and
Denmark entered the EC. Although Ireland was clearly the poorest of the
group and did have a recent history of emigration, it had a small population,
a stable political system, was attractive to investors, and seemed to be
developing rapidly. The expansion from nine to twelve Members was much
more difficult. Greece, Spain, and Portugal, the EC-3 countries, were
politically less stable than their EC-9 counterparts, 21 and on a per capita
basis, had gross national products that were slightly more than two-fifths of
the EC-9 countries'. By every measure, they were substantially poorer,
and-based on past migration patterns--could reasonably be expected to

121. Each had also experienced a significant period of authoritarian military rule during the postWorld War II era, and had produced refugees. The most significant refugee migration from these
countries occurred in Spain during the late 1930s, when Franco unseated the Spanish Republican
government.
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export workers seeking higher wages. 122 Their admission was, therefore,
tied to seven-year limits on labor migration. "With the enlargement of the
EC, there was concern about increased immigration from the poorer regions
and restrictions were placed on immigration from Greece [admitted in 1981 ]
until 1988 and until 1993 for Spain and Portugal [admitted in 1986].' ' 123
With the sudden end of the Cold War, many of the countries in eastern and
central Europe have expressed an interest in joining the EC. Eventually,
some-the Czech Republic and Slovakia are two likely candidates-will
almost certainly be admitted. Concerns about uncontrolled migration
occasioned by political instability, large wage differentials, or both, are
likely to delay expansion considerably.
If Europe, which accepts the notion of an integrated labor market, is so
cautious about expanding that market, it seems certain that the United States,
which does not, will proceed with even greater caution in dealing with
Mexico-or any of its other Latin or Caribbean neighbors. Any attempt to
expand NAFTA to permit free labor migration will have to confront the fact
that the economic differential between the United States and Canada on the
one hand, and Mexico on the other, is between two and five times greater
than the differential between the EC-9 and the EC-3.12 4 Further, the

122. See ROBERT C. SHELBURNE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC DISCUSSION PAPER 39, THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: COMPARISONS WITH SOUTHERN EC ENLARGEMENT (1991),
reprinted in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 43, 45
(Koshrow Fatemi ed., 1993). (Table 4.1 Income and Population Comparisons, indicates that the "per
capita GNP" ratio of EC-3 to EC-9 countries was 0.43 and the "per capita GDP" ratio of EC-3 to EC-9
countries was 0.57).
Shelburne notes that "[i]mmigrants from the EC-3 accounted for approximately 1.5 per cent of the
workforce of the EC-9 in 1984" -three years after Greece was admitted to the EC and two years before
Spain and Portugal were admitted. Id. at 51.
123. Id. at 51-52.
*
124. The following table, based on 1988 data, summarized and compiled by Shelburne, illustrates
the comparative differences in wealth and also indicates that Mexico has a comparatively larger
population than its EC-3 counterparts:
I
Per capita GNP
EC-3/EC-9
0.43
Mexico/Canada-U.S.
0.09
Per capita GDP
EC-3/EC-9
0.57
Mexico/Canada-U.S.
0.28
Population
EC-3/EC-9
0.22
Mexico/Canada-U.S.
0.31
GNP
EC-3/EC-9
0.10
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number of potential job-seekers from the EC-3, as determined by gross
population, birthrate, age distribution, and secular unemployment rates, was
and is, in both relative and absolute terms, much smaller than the number
from Mexico (the difference in magnitude, if we consider any sort of
western hemisphere market, is staggering). This disparity has meant that
ongoing legal and illegal migration from Mexico (and other nearby western
hemisphere countries) to the United States is greater, both in relative and
absolute terms, than was the migration from the EC-3 countries at the time
of their entry into the EC, and this disparity is likely to increase.'2 5
Although economic development in Mexico may eventually lower
migration demand, current political instability there'26 raises the prospect
that migration totals could soar. It is important to note that political
instability in Mexico today is much greater than it was in Portugal, Greece,
or Spain when they secured admittance to the EC, or than it currently is in
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and a number of other
countries carved out of the Soviet Union and the former "Eastern bloc."
The Mexican political system is nearly more comparable to the situation
prevailing today in Russia, and has considerable potential for promoting a
large migrant stream.
For all of these reasons, Maastricht appears largely irrelevant in the
North American context. There is little reason to believe that its equivocal
example or the appeal of an efficient international labor market is going to
outweigh d~mestic fears about possible unregulated migration from a large
and overpopulated neighbor. The refusal of the United States to even

Mexico/Canada-U.S.
0.03
See id. at 45, Table 4.1, Income and Population Comparisons.
125. See, e.g., id. at 52.
Since 1960 the United States has on average granted permanent residence status to over
50,000 Mexicans a year; in addition, Mexicans may enter as temporary workers-22,500
Mexicans entered under this provision in 1989. Significant numbers of Mexicans enter the
United States illegally; during 1990 over a million Mexicans were caught trying to illegally
cross into the United States. Currently about 2 percent of the U.S. workforce were born in
Mexico; this is similar to the proportion of EC-3 workers in the EC-9.
The two cases are therefore similar in that the new regions have a long history of
supplying labor to the core areas. One major difference, however, is that the trend had
decreased or even turned negative in Europe prior to enlargement while Mexican emigration
to the United States continues to rise.
Id. It should be noted that the 50,000 per year average Shelbume gives appears to ignore the
approximately 3,000,000 people-the great majority Mexican-who were "legalized" under the
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. See IRCA, supra note 35.
126. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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consider bringing free labor migration under the NAFTA umbrella is
probably a harbinger of things to come.' 27
IV. CONCLUSION

The world is a much smaller place than it was when the present
international system of independent nation-states was first established. It
houses many more people, and it links them much more closely through an
elaborate communication and transportation network. Events in different
countries or on different continents have the power to affect the entire
world: disease can overrun the planet, pollution destroy its oceans and
poison its air. However global the world's problems are, they usually affect
some people more directly and harshly than others. Overpopulation,
poverty, persecution, and persistent warfare are distributed unequally over
the face of the earth. The gulf between rich and poor States and the gulf
between States that respect the integrity of the person and those that do not,
is probably growing. In the face of such inequality, it is probably inevitable
that an increasing number of the threatened, the desperate, and the
chronically underemployed will find their way to more favored places.
The residents of such places-the United States and Canada, Australia
and New Zealand, the EC countries, and the developed countries of
Asia-have four responses available: concerted attempts to solve or at least
manage the problems generating migration; carefully-measured, selfinterested generosity, coupled with rigorous border control at the national
level; coordinated measures to deter or regulate migration; or the elimination
of borders. A truly global response to immigration problems must address

See Sidney Weintraub, The Coming Debate on NAFTA, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 18, 28-29 (Koshrow Fatemi ed., 1993).
When Mexico took the initiative for a free trade agreement with the United States, both
Mexican officials and private citizens suggested that migration issues should be included in
the negotiations. The reasoning was twofold: this is an important issue in the relationship and
some formal understandings would be desirable; and if capital movements were to be
included, as of course they were, then the movement of the other major factor of
production-labor--should also be part of the agreement.
127.

AGREEMENT:

This was not accepted by the United States . . . . Indeed, I know from personal
discussions that the Mexican authorities were told there would be no free trade discussions
if they insisted on migration provisions, other than those related to temporary entry for
business people.
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root causes, yet doing so is very difficult: such responses tend to proceed
piece-meal over extended periods of time, and raise many questions that this
article cannot and does not address. In most respects, the second
option---ordinary immigration law and policy-is local, particular,
nationalistic, and selfish. Driven mainly by interest-based politics and
making use of the various devices employed by States to establish their
borders and identify and separate "insiders" from "outsiders," it establishes
exclusion as the norm, admission as a special act of grace.
The third option, systematic cooperation, has been employed most
successfully in dealing with refugees created between the end of World War
II and the late 1970s. The global refugee regime, which emerged during the
Cold War period and helped resettle millions of involuntary migrants from
Asia and eastern Europe and care for millions of others from Africa and
Central America, appears, however, to be rapidly running out of gas due to
the large and growing numbers of refugees, the loss of a common antiCommunist purpose, and adverse local reaction to resettlement.
Consequently, energies have been refocused on collective deterrence and the
rapid repatriation of refugees.
The willingness of the developed nations to provide massive on-site aid
during "emergencies," such as the one now occurring in Rwanda, suggests
that some progress has been made. Yet, as far as resettlement is concerned,
the current U.S. response to Haitian "boat people" is probably quite
typical.128 Thus, it appears that the world has returned to where it was
during the days of the Third Reich, when the United States and other
nations routinely refused to let shiploads of Jews land, instead returning the
"coffin ships" to Germany.129

128. The practice of refusing to let refugee boats land and seek asylum is apparently a fairly
common practice. For a particularly brutal example, which aroused the humanitarian sentiments of
western countries when it occurred, see LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 21, at 128 (describing the
practice of Malaysian and Thai officials, who pushed crowded refugee boats back to sea during the
Indochinese migration, with considerable loss of life).
129. The parallels between the past and the present are far from exact, since the developed
countries are far richer, racial and ethnic prejudice within their borders is not officially tolerated
(although it undoubtedly exists), and the worldwide refugee population is so much larger. Nevertheless,
there are many rough similarities-including the "compassion fatigue" that was present then and is so
evident today. The observations of Walter Adams, made in the spring of 1939, thus, are still relevant:
The refugees from German Nazism are relatively few in number.... A quarter of a million
in the course of six years is a small total compared with the great numbers involved in the
Greek, Russian, and Armenian movements. The stubbornness of the problems raised by the
German emigration lies in the circumstances that condition it. It originates in a persecution
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The final option, elimination of borders, is by far the most radical.
Arguably, eliminating borders, particularly if the efforts are confined only
to those seeking work, would better match jobs with those qualified to fill
them. It would also increase production, create wealth, and help reduce
poverty.130 Developments in Europe prove that "internal frontiers" can,
in fact, be almost totally eliminated. Nonetheless, as W.R. B6hning has
indicated:
In each case, the countries that relax the controls on entry and
employment of selected nationalities expect this move to be in the
interests of their citizens, in a narrow economic sense or in a
broader political way. Preferential treatment does not remove the
'we-they' or 'in-out' distinction but adds gradations. Sovereignty,
as such, is not relinquished. Exclusion or expulsion of foreigners
on grounds of public order or security remains a national
prerogative. And the general principle of final say rests in national
hands, even where supra-national powers are conferred to joint
bodies (as in the European Economic Community), for national
governments keep the reserve power of withdrawal from the supranational mechanism to which they voluntarily acceded.'
In the EU, recent developments suggest that "self-interest" can extend
beyond national borders and that traditional "sovereignty," in some or all of
its particulars, can yield to a new federal order. Concerns about disparities
in wealth and the possibility of politically-inspired mass migration, however,
have put definite limits on the expansion of the EU. In North America,
of minorities even more cruel because more deliberate than that of the Armenians. It has
occurred at a time of economic crisis that has almost stopped normal migration. It has been
accompanied by the organized stimulation throughout the world of an anti-Semitism which
has rendered the settlement and even temporary asylum of the refugees more difficult. It has
occurred at a time when public opinion has been numbed, if not brutalized, by an ever
increasing accumulation of horrors.
Adams, supra note 65, at 32.
130. See, e.g., BOHNING, supra note 107:
One can tentatively conclude: (i) the migration of economically active persons (other than
refugees and family members) is occasioned by production needs in the country deliberately
admitting them, (ii) the migrant-receiving country, the migrants themselves and probably the
migrant-sending country benefit from the move, and (iii) in a world where production is
woefully inadequate in relation to known needs, such migration invariably satisfies needs and,
especially where it involves people going from poor to rich countries, contributes to the
reduction of world poverty.
Id. at 35.
131. Id. at 41.
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similar concerns have placed labor migration outside the universe of "free
132
trade," economic arguments have been trumped by political ones,
borders are policed locally, and the State persists in all its selfish glory.

132.

See, e.g., id. at 46:
[T]he rest of this century will very likely see increased emigration pressures from poor
countries, which are usually populous and their typical inhabitant young. More development
in the rich and poor countries will, if anything, accelerate this secular trend-until that
unlikely day when living standards tend toward rough comparability within and between
countries.
In the face of rising emigration pressures on a planet limited in space and cut up into
mutually exclusive sovereignties, governments will become more sensitive about immigration.
No doubt, economicforces will continue to open borders much of the time while social
and political will tend to close them most of the time.
Id. (emphasis added).

